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VACATING LEGALLY-ERRONEOUS ARBITRATION AWARDS
By
Stephen J. Ware*
Abstract: In the United States, arbitrators’ decisions are legally binding. Courts
generally confirm and enforce, rather than vacate, arbitration awards. Suppose, however,
that the arbitration award is very different from the judgment a court would have
rendered had the dispute been litigated, rather than arbitrated. And suppose this is
because the arbitrator did not correctly apply the law. If the party that lost in arbitration
(the party that would have done better with a correct application of law) asks a court to
vacate the award because it is legally erroneous, will the court vacate or confirm the
award? And does the answer depend on:






Whether the parties formed their agreement to arbitrate before or after the
dispute arose?
Whether the agreement’s terms ask courts to vacate or confirm legallyerroneous arbitration awards?
Whether the arbitrator did not try to apply the law or tried to apply it but did
so incorrectly?
Whether the law the arbitrator did not correctly apply is well-established or in
doubt? Simple or complex?
Whether the law the arbitrator did not correctly apply is mandatory law
(binding on the parties despite a contract term to the contrary) or default law
the parties may contract around?

These questions are the subject of this article. I suggest that arbitration law in the United
States has answered these questions differently over time and that these changes in legal
doctrine roughly divide into four eras. Unfortunately, recent Supreme Court cases have
left much uncertainty on the fundamental question whether arbitration awards must apply
the law correctly to avoid vacatur.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, arbitrators’ decisions are legally binding. Courts generally
confirm and enforce arbitration awards. However, a party disappointed with an
arbitrator’s decision may ask a court to vacate the arbitration award. In some ways, a
court considering whether to vacate an arbitration award is like an appellate court
considering whether to reverse the decision of a trial court. But “the grounds on which
courts review arbitration awards are much narrower than the grounds on which appeals
courts review decisions of trial courts.”1 In particular, when appellate courts reverse trial
courts they generally do so on the ground that the trial court has erred in its findings of
fact or conclusions of law. Appellate courts usually give some deference to trial courts’
factual findings—reversing only those that are “clearly erroneous”—but give no
deference to trial courts’ legal rulings, reviewing them de novo. So the typical appeal of
a trial court’s decision centers on the appellant’s argument that the trial court made an
error of law.
By contrast, arbitrators’ legal rulings are rarely given de novo review by courts
considering a motion to vacate an arbitration award.2 In fact, the Federal Arbitration Act
may not allow courts to review arbitrators’ legal rulings at all because “error of law” by
the arbitrator is not expressly listed among the grounds for vacating an arbitration award.
Suppose, however, that the arbitration award is very different from the judgment a court
would have rendered had the dispute been litigated, rather than arbitrated. And suppose
this is because the arbitrator did not correctly apply the law. 3 If the party that lost in
arbitration (the party that would have done better with a correct application of law) asks a
court to vacate the award because it is legally erroneous, will the court vacate or confirm
the award? And does the answer depend on:






1

Whether the parties formed their agreement to arbitrate before or after the
dispute arose?
Whether the agreement’s terms ask courts to vacate or confirm legallyerroneous arbitration awards?
Whether the arbitrator did not try to apply the law or tried to apply it but did
so incorrectly?
Whether the law the arbitrator did not correctly apply is well-established or in
doubt? Simple or complex?
Whether the law the arbitrator did not correctly apply is mandatory law
(binding on the parties despite a contract term to the contrary) or default law
the parties may contract around?

CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS 494 (2d. ed. 2006).

2

See Maureen A. Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute: The Federal Arbitration Act and
Displacement of Agency Regulation, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 59, 62-63 (2013) (“Arbitration awards
are virtually unreviewable on the merits and are rarely vacated.”).
3

“The law” in this context means the substantive law (governing the merits of the parties’ dispute) a court
would have applied had the dispute been litigated, rather than arbitration law governing the formation,
terms and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.
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These questions are the subject of this article. I suggest that arbitration law in the United
States has answered these questions differently over time and that these changes in legal
doctrine roughly divide into four eras.
The first era, predating the 1920’s, was when courts did not enforce executory
arbitration agreements. During this period, arbitration awards arose out of post-dispute
arbitration agreements, rather than pre-dispute arbitration agreements, and this fact made
it relatively easy and uncontroversial for courts to enforce, rather than vacate legallyerroneous arbitration awards.
The second era, from the 1920’s to the 1980’s, was when courts enforced predispute arbitration agreements but only with respect to claims arising under default rules
of law, such as breach of contract claims, as opposed to claims arising under mandatory
rules of law, such as antitrust, securities and employment discrimination claims. The fact
that mandatory law claims were excluded from enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements allowed courts to continuing enforcing legally-erroneous awards while
avoiding significant controversy and remaining consistent with non-arbitration law.
That consistency ended and the third era began when, from 1985-1991, the
Supreme Court began enforcing pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate mandatory law
claims. This raised fears that claims in areas such as employment discrimination and
investor and consumer protection would be sent to “lawless” arbitration—privatizing
areas of law that non-arbitration law excludes from the privatizing effects of pre-dispute
contracts. Perhaps to calm such fears, when the Supreme Court began enforcing predispute agreements to arbitrate mandatory law claims, it began saying that “judicial
scrutiny of arbitration awards...is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute”4 giving rise to the mandatory-law claim asserted in
arbitration, e.g., the Securities Exchange Act or the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. In other words, the Court perhaps hinted that its 1985-1991 change to enforcing
executory agreements to arbitrate mandatory law claims required a change to the
longstanding rule against judicially-reviewing arbitrators’ rulings on questions of law.
Following this hint, by the late 1990’s, some courts pushed case law toward vacating
legally-erroneous awards arising out of mandatory law claims. The doctrinal hook for
doing this was usually the “manifest disregard of law” ground for vacatur. However,
other courts disagreed and interpreted the manifest-disregard doctrine more narrowly. So
by 2008 the law on this question was ripe for clarification from the Supreme Court or
Congress.
Also during this era leading up to 2008, a circuit split arose over whether courts
should vacate legally-erroneous awards on the ground that the arbitration agreement asks
them to do so. While these agreements may have been enforced before the 1920’s, their
enforceability did not generate many reported cases from then until around the turn of the
twenty-first century, at which point the issue was actively litigated and divided the courts.
So by 2008, two important issues on legally-erroneous arbitration awards divided the
courts. The Supreme Court’s 2008 Hall Street Associates v. Mattel,5 case addressed both
of them.
4

Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987). Accord 14 Penn Plaza LLC v.
Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, n.10 (2009); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4 (1991).
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The fourth era began with Hall Street and continues to the present. During this
era, most courts follow Hall Street by declining to vacate legally-erroneous awards just
because the arbitration agreement asks them to do so. However, Hall Street and later
Supreme Court cases did not resolve whether the manifest-disregard doctrine continues
and, more broadly, when arbitration awards must apply the law correctly to avoid
vacatur.
II.

FOUR ERAS
A. Pre-1920’s: Before Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements
1. Deference to Parties’ Submission on Vacating Legally-Erroneous
Awards

Arbitration, like litigation, is a form of binding adjudication. Litigation is
adjudication in a public (government) forum and arbitration is adjudication in a private
forum. Litigation is the default process of dispute resolution; that is, parties can contract
into alternative processes of dispute resolution, but if they do not, then each party retains
the right to have the dispute resolved in litigation. By contrast, a dispute does not go to
arbitration unless the parties have contracted to have an arbitrator resolve that dispute.6
In other words, arbitration binds only those who contracted for it.
Sometimes parties with an existing dispute contract to send that dispute to
arbitration. Such post-dispute arbitration agreements are now relatively rare and noncontroversial. More common in recent decades,7 and more controversial, are pre-dispute
arbitration agreements. These are contracts containing a clause providing that, if a dispute
arises, the parties will resolve that dispute in arbitration, rather than litigation. These
arbitration clauses typically are written broadly to cover any dispute the parties’
transaction might produce, but also can be written more narrowly to cover just some
potential disputes.8
5

Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).

6

See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (“‘arbitration is a matter of
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit.’” (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Naval Co., 363 US 574, 582 (1960)); Local 21
v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 491 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir.2007); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
943 (1995) (“arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties.”)).
7

See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration, 79 TENN.
L. REV. 289, 346 (2012) (noting 96.3% of cases arose out of pre-dispute agreements, while only 3.7% arose
out of post-dispute agreements to arbitrate); Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire: The
Feasibility of Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 319
(2003) (analyzing the American Arbitration Association data on the infrequency of post-dispute arbitration
clauses in employment cases); Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187,
209 (2006) (“[T]he use of post-dispute arbitration agreements is rare relative to the use of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.”).
8

See STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.3(a) (2007).
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While pre-dispute arbitration agreements are now more common than postdispute arbitration agreements, that was not likely true at all times in the past. Before the
1920’s, courts in the United States generally did not enforce executory agreements to
arbitrate, that is, arbitration agreements not yet performed by either party. 9
Consequently, pre-dispute arbitration agreements were unenforceable.10
While some parties may nevertheless have formed pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, any such agreements were insufficient in and of themselves to produce
arbitration proceedings and awards—in the important sense that if a party, after a dispute
arose, chose not to keep its promise to arbitrate then that party would be under no legal
compulsion to do so.11 As a result, arbitration proceedings and awards only occurred
when both parties made the post-dispute decision to arbitrate that dispute. Such parties
often used post-dispute arbitration agreements to specify the procedures of their
arbitration.
Arbitration agreements can be divided into two types: those that require the
arbitrator to apply the law correctly (“restricted” or “special” submissions to arbitration)
and those that do not (“unrestricted” or “general” submissions).12 Unrestricted
9

See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNALIZATION 34-47 (1992) (summarizing that in 1920, New York became the first state to enact a
statute, 1920 N.Y. LAWS CH. 275, § 2, providing specific enforcement for arbitration agreements); see also
James Oldham & Su Jin Kim, Arbitration in America: The Early History, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 241 (2013)
(discussing very early American arbitration cases).
10

Parties could breach their arbitration agreements without fear of any court-ordered sanction beyond
nominal damages. See I. MACNEIL, R. SPEIDEL, & T. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW:
AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 4.3.2.2 (1994) (noting
that during the period 1800-1920, agreements to arbitrate future disputes were not specifically enforceable
in the United States); See also WESLEY STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 262 (1930);
See also Munson v. Straits of Dover S.S. Co., 102 F. 926 (2d Cir. 1900) (holding that plaintiff who sought
damages-in the form of lawyer's fees and costs incurred in defending a lawsuit-for breach of an agreement
to arbitrate was entitled to nominal damages only).
11

Of course parties may have non-legal reasons to keep promises, including promises to arbitrate. See, e.g.,
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 116 (1992) (diamond industry relies on “reputation-bond-based extralegal
contractual regimes” including arbitration); Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern
Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479
(1995) (“arbitration backed by nonlegal sanctions was well established long before the passage of
arbitration statutes”); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 67, 70 (2014) (“lenders may feel that they can rely on dispute resolution terms even when those terms
are formally unenforceable. For example, a borrower concerned with its reputation for promise-keeping
might honor a promise to arbitrate even if the doctrine of absolute immunity would prevent a court from
compelling it to participate in the arbitration or from enforcing an arbitration award”).
12

See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hutchinson, 710 A.2d 1343, 1346 (1998) (“The submission tells the
arbitrators what they are obligated to decide. The determination by a court of whether the submission was
restricted or unrestricted tells the court what its scope of review is regarding the arbitrators' decision.”);
Metro. Waste Control Comm’n v. City of Minnetonka, 242 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn.1976) (“The scope of
the arbitrators' power is controlled by the language of the submission. Where the arbitrators are not
restricted by the submission to decide according to principles of law, they may make an award according to
their own notion of justice without regard to the law. Where the arbitrators are restricted, however, they
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submissions give the arbitrator discretion whether to decide the case according to law or
according to some other source of norms, such as the customs in the parties’ industry13 or
the arbitrator’s own sense of equity.14
With respect to legally-erroneous arbitration awards, pre-1920’s courts generally
stated legal rules that turned on whether a submission to arbitration was restricted or
unrestricted.15 Typical was the United States Supreme Court’s 1855 statement of the
following legal rule: “If the award is within the submission and contains the honest
decision of the arbitrators after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will
not set it aside for error, either in law or fact.”16 With this rule prevailing, pre-1920’s
have no authority to disregard the law.” (citations omitted)); Muldrow v. Norris, 2 Cal. 74, 77–78 (1852)
(“It is true, under a general submission, arbitrators have power to decide upon the law and facts; and a mere
mistake of law cannot be taken advantage of. . . . A distinction seems to have been taken in the books
between general and special awards. In the case of a general finding, it appears to be well settled that courts
will not inquire into mistakes by evidence aliunde; but where the arbitrators have made any point a matter
of judicial inquiry by spreading it upon the record, and they mistake the law in a palpable and material
point, their award will be set aside... These special awards are not to be commended, as arbitrators may
often decide with perfect equity between the parties, and not give good reasons for their decision; but when
a special award is once before the Court, it must stand or fall by its own intrinsic correctness, tested by
legal principles.” (quotations omitted)); Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall
Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1149-50 (2009) (referring to “general submissions in which the
arbitrator has no constraints on her judgment,” and stating “With restricted submissions, the arbitrator may
make an initial decision on the law, but the parties reserve for the court the power to make a final decision,
thus allowing for judicial review for questions of law.”); see generally C.J.S. Arbitration, Matters Which
May Be Ordered, Awarded, or Decided Under Submission--General, Special or Restricted Submission §
161 (2005) (outlining and defining the difference between general and specific submission in the case of
arbitration disputes).
As Professor Drahozal points out, “submissions can be restricted in any number of ways. But in this
context, the most relevant restriction is one that requires the arbitrators to follow the law.” Christopher R.
Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 914 n.50 (2010).
13

Some industries have developed their own bodies of law applied by their own arbitrators, who are often
merchants rather than lawyers. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (discussing the grain
industry); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (discussing the diamond industry); Lisa Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (discussing the cotton industry); see also Lisa Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law, in PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 108, 108 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998) (“Private commercial law exists in over fifty industries including diamonds, grain,
feed, independent films, printing, binding, peanuts, rice, cotton, burlap, rubber, hay and tea.”).
14

A small number of arbitration agreements call for application of the arbitrator’s own sense of equity.
Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at the New Law Merchant,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 538-39 (2005); Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 187, 206-07 (2006).
15

James M. Gaitis, Unraveling the Mystery of Wilko v. Swan: American Arbitration Vacatur Law and the
Accidental Demise of Party Autonomy, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 17 (2007) (“From its earliest
beginnings, the foundation of American arbitration law always has been the fundamental principle that it is
the parties' ‘submission’ that determines the scope of the arbitrators' authority and, in consequence, the
power of courts to vacate arbitral awards.”).
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courts rarely vacated legally-erroneous arbitration awards arising out of unrestricted
submissions.17 In contrast, pre-1920’s courts acknowledged the possibility of vacating
legally-erroneous awards arising out of restricted submissions, although they generally
did so in dicta,18 and persuading a court to vacate a legally-erroneous award on the
16

Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 345 (1854); see also Sherfy v. Graham, 72 Ill. 158, 159 (1874) (stating
arbitrators, “by the submission, become judges, by the choice of the parties, both of the law and the facts,
and there is no appeal or review from or of any decision made by them within the scope of their powers,
except for fraud, partiality or misconduct.”); Pulliam v. Pensoneau, 33 Ill. 374, 378 (1864) (“The
conclusion at which arbitrators arrive is the judgment of the court of the parties' own choosing. And in most
respects it is similar to other judgments. It is conclusive upon the parties, both as to the law and facts. A
mistake in either is not usually corrected by the courts[.]”); In re Curtis et al., 30 A. 769, 772 (Conn. 1894)
(“The uniform rule of decision has been in this State that in such cases a court of equity will not set aside
an award except for partiality and corruption in the arbitrators, mistakes on their own principles, or fraud or
misbehavior in the parties.”).
James Gaitis emphasizes that the quote from Burchell continues “to induce the court to interfere [with
the award], there must be something more than an error of judgment, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or
gross mistake, either apparent on the face of the award, or to be made out by evidence; but in the case of
mistake, it must be made out to the satisfaction of the arbitrator, and that if it had not happened, he should
have made a different award.” Gaitis, supra note 15, at 25 (quoting Burchell, 58 U.S. at 349-50). Gaitis
argues that Burchell distinguishes between “the arbitrator's intended decision” not to correctly apply the
law (which courts should enforce) and mistakes that “if properly understood by the arbitrator, would have
been correctly applied by the arbitrator”, which courts should vacate. Gaitis, supra note 15, at 26.
17

The US Supreme Court and other pre-1920’s courts sometimes said courts could vacate legally-erroneous
awards. See United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. 406, 420 (1874) (“The award was also liable ... to be set
aside ... [f]or exceeding the power conferred by the submission, for manifest mistake of law, for fraud, and
for all the reasons on which awards are set aside in courts of law or chancery.”) However, they rarely did
so. See Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest Disregard of the Law”
Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 151 (2011) (emphasizing that 19th Century law distinguished statutory
arbitration from common law arbitration: While statutes varied from state to state, statutory arbitration
generally treated arbitrators as adjuncts to the court, while common law arbitration “allowed parties to
fashion their own dispute resolution rules and procedures” and “courts treated awards with more
deference.”). Perhaps 19th Century statutory arbitration was the predecessor of today’s non-binding courtannexed arbitration while 19th Century common law arbitration was the predecessor to today’s binding
contractual arbitration. See WARE, supra note 8, at §4.32 (contrasting non-binding court-annexed
arbitration with binding contractual arbitration).
18

In all of the following cases, the courts’ statements about vacating legally-erroneous awards were merely
dicta because the courts did not in fact vacate awards. See, e.g., White Mountains R.R. v. Beane, 39 N. H.
107, 108 (1859) (“[I]f the parties agree that the arbitrators shall make their award agreeably to legal
principles, and if they mistake the law the award will be set aside.”); Sanborn v. Murphy, 50 N. H. 65, 67
(1870) (“Parties may, and often do, limit a reference by providing that the award shall be made in
accordance with legal principles, in which case the referees will be bound by the limitation; and if in such
case they disregard or mistake the law, their award will be set aside.”); Kleine v. Catara, 14 F. Cas. 732,
734 (C.C.D.Mass. 1814) (In recommitting the award, the court said, “If the parties wish to reserve the law
for the decision of the court they may stipulate to that effect in the submission. . . . If no such reservation is
made in the submission, the parties are presumed to agree that everything, both as to law and fact, which is
necessary to the ultimate decision, is included in the authority of the referees.”); Boston Water Power Co.
v. Gray, 6 Mass. 166 (1843)(“If the submission be of a certain controversy, expressing that it is to be
decided conformably to the principles of law . . . then, if it appears by the award, to a court of competent
jurisdiction, that the arbitrators have decided contrary to law . . . the decision is not within the scope of their
authority as determined by the submission, and is for that reason void.”); Gray, 6 Mass. at 168 (“Another
case, somewhat analogous, is where it is manifest, upon the award itself, that the arbitrator intended to
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ground that the submission required a legally-correct award apparently took “very strong
language” in the submission.19 Overall then, it appears that pre-1920’s courts deferred to
the parties’ submission agreement on whether to enforce legally-erroneous awards but
used a very strong interpretive presumption in favor of enforcement and opposed to
vacatur.
2. The Case for Deferring to the Submission—At Least if it is Formed
Post-Dispute
Deferring to the parties’ submission agreement on whether to enforce legallyerroneous awards appeals to me. To the extent pre-1920’s courts enforced restricted
submissions by vacating legally-erroneous awards, these courts helped parties who, when
forming their arbitration agreement, wanted both arbitration (instead of a court trial) and
confidence that courts would meaningfully police the arbitrator’s rulings of law. So I
praise pre-1920’s courts to the extent they actually enforced restricted submissions with
vacatur of legally-erroneous awards.
In addition, I praise the deference pre-1920’s courts showed to party autonomy in
the context of unrestricted submissions. That is, I praise courts’ willingness to enforce
legally-erroneous awards arising out of arbitration agreements that do not ask courts to
vacate legally-erroneous awards. This deference to parties who contracted for courts to
enforce arbitration awards that do not correctly apply the law appeals to my
libertarianism, which generally holds that if parties do not want to be governed by a
particular set of laws then they should be free to make enforceable contracts opting out of
those laws and into whatever alternatives they choose. So instead of always wanting
arbitration awards to correctly apply the law, I generally want arbitration awards to depart
from the law if that is what the parties have agreed the arbitrator should do.
While this view may intrigue libertarians, it troubles some other people,
especially when applied to arbitration arising out of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.20
A pre-dispute arbitration agreement nearly always consists of an arbitration clause among
many non-arbitration clauses in a contract. For example, a form contract prepared by
decide according to law but has mistaken the law. Then it is set aside because it is manifest that the result
does not conform to the real judgment of the arbitrator[.]”); Greenough v. Rolfe, 4 N.H. 357, 365 (“As the
referees were bound by the agreement of the parties to decide according to law, they must be presumed to
have intended so to decide, and as they have mistaken the law of the case, their report is not what they
intended it to be, and cannot be accepted.”).
19

See Philip G. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARV. L. REV. 590,
603-04 (1934); see also STURGES, supra note 10, at 793-94 (stating the argument that a legally erroneous
award should be vacated “has rarely been made effective to set aside any award, and, further, that the courts
will not readily construe the terms of a submission agreement as requiring the arbitrators to decide
according to law”); White Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg, 220 Ill. 578, 606 (1906) (stating “even where the
articles of submission clearly and unqualifiedly require the decision of the arbitrators to be according to law
or in conformity with the principles of the law, the language is not to be construed as a limitation upon the
power of the arbitrators, but as merely directory”).
20

See, e.g., David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights Doctrine,
60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723 (2012).
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Seller’s lawyer for all of Seller’s sales of goods might include among its thirty clauses,
stretching over five pages, a clause requiring Seller and Buyer to arbitrate, rather than
litigate, any dispute arising out of or relating to the transaction. When Buyer signs the
form or otherwise manifests assent to it, Buyer might not read the arbitration clause, let
alone understand it and reflect on it, much less discuss it with counsel or negotiate it with
Seller. In addition, a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is typically a broad agreement
about how to resolve any dispute that may arise between the parties, so it is generally
difficult—even for parties thinking about arbitration while forming the contract—to
anticipate all the possible disputes that might arise and assess how a duty to arbitrate,
rather than litigate, will affect each of them.
Under such contracting circumstances, some people may be leery of holding that
Buyer’s arbitration agreement contracts out of otherwise applicable law. Under predispute contracting circumstances like these, some people may believe that party
autonomy (at least Buyer’s autonomy) is more likely furthered by careful judicial review
of awards—to ensure they correctly apply the law—than by enforcing legally-erroneous
awards. However, the contracting circumstances of this Seller-Buyer example are very
different from the contracting circumstances from which pre-1920’s awards arose. As
noted above, pre-1920’s awards arose out of post-dispute, not pre-dispute, arbitration
agreements. Because pre-1920’s awards arose out of post-dispute agreements to
arbitrate, courts of that era could enforce awards that did not correctly apply the law for
the same reasons courts enforce settlement agreements that do not correctly apply the
law.
3. Post-Dispute Arbitration Agreements as a Type of Settlement
Agreement
“[C]ourts are generally happy to bless the parties’ settlement without inquiring
about its terms.”21 In other words, courts enforce settlement agreements without asking
whether their results match, or even remotely approximate, the results a court would have
reached after litigation. This, I believe, is largely because the level of consent to
settlement agreements tends to be high; and that is because settlement agreements are
formed post-dispute. Compared with pre-dispute arbitration agreements, settlement
agreements tend to be formed at a time when parties are more likely to be advised by a
21

WARE, supra note 8, at § 2.47 (citing Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d
677, 681 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The fairness of a settlement of a legal dispute is like the adequacy of the
consideration supporting a contractual promise: a matter best left to negotiation between the parties.”) See
generally 15A C.J.S. COMPROMISE & SETTLEMENT § 33 (2014) (“As a general rule, a settlement agreement
is considered valid and enforceable if it is entered into in good faith, and courts will not invalidate
settlement agreements absent a strong showing that they violate good morals or the public interest because
of error, bad faith, or fraud.”); Russell v. U. S., 320 F.2d 920, 928 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (“Because it is not
normally concerned with the soundness of a compromise, the court customarily accepts stipulated
settlements calling for judgments against the United States, without any inquiry into the correctness of the
legal principles or factual assumptions on which the compromise may be founded.”); Trenton St. Ry. Co. v.
Lawlor, 71 A. 234, 236 (N.J. 1908) (The court will not inquire into the adequacy or inadequacy of the
consideration of a compromise fairly and deliberately made); Baptist v. City of Kankakee, 481 F.3d 485,
492 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs received value in exchange for the settlement of their claim, so
the Court will not inquire to the adequacy of the settlement terms).
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lawyer. In addition, while a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is typically a broad
agreement about how to resolve any dispute that may arise between the parties, a postdispute agreement to settle is usually only an agreement about how to resolve one dispute
and that one dispute already exists and is known to all the parties agreeing to settle it.22
For these reasons, parties to (post-dispute) settlement agreements are more likely than
parties to pre-dispute arbitration agreements to appreciate the rights they lose by forming
the agreement.
These contrasts between settlement agreements and pre-dispute arbitration
agreements are also contrasts between post-dispute arbitration agreements and predispute arbitration agreements. A post-dispute arbitration agreement is essentially a
settlement agreement that leaves some of its important terms unspecified until the
arbitrator specifies them.23 For instance, an ordinary settlement agreement specifies terms
such as the amount of money Defendant will pay Plaintiff to dismiss the claim, while a
post-dispute arbitration agreement asks the arbitrator to specify this term in an award
ordering Defendant to pay money to Plaintiff. One may think of a post-dispute arbitration
agreement as a settlement agreement with large gaps in its terms; and the parties, by
forming the agreement, delegate to the arbitrator their power to fill those gaps. Seen this
way, post-dispute arbitration agreements and the awards they produce deserve the same
judicial deference long afforded to ordinary settlement agreements, that is, settlements
without large gaps.
Whether settling parties choose to leave large gaps, the filling of which they
delegate to an arbitrator, seems not to be a big enough distinction to arouse courts’
concerns, given the high levels of consent parties generally give to post-dispute
agreements to settle or arbitrate. So it makes sense that pre-1920’s courts readily
22

Compare Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration As Exceptional Consumer Law (with A Contractualist
Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 198 (1998) (noting post-dispute arbitration
agreements are about a particular dispute that has already arisen between parties); Elizabeth Varner,
Arbitrating Cultural Property Disputes, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 477, 491 (2012) (“The postdispute arbitration agreement can be more tailored to the dispute than a pre-dispute arbitration agreement as
the parties know the specific issues in post-dispute arbitration agreements”), with David S. Schwartz, If You
Love Arbitration, Set It Free: How "Mandatory" Undermines "Arbitration", 8 NEV. L.J. 400, 402 (2007)
(Stating “broad form” pre-dispute arbitration agreements require ‘all disputes’ to be submitted to
arbitration); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW.
U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (Noting that courts liberally compel arbitration of all nature of claims within the
scope of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: ""One Size Fits
All'' Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759, 764 (2001) (noting that broad pre-dispute
arbitration agreements are more common after the passage of the FAA).
23

Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 209, 288 (2000) (“Because of the similarity in economic terms between post-dispute arbitration
agreements and settlement agreements, they should be considered on the same terms in policy discussions.
Arguments against post-dispute arbitration agreements are economically indistinguishable from arguments
against settlement.”); Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrability in Recent Federal Civil Rights Legislation: The
Need for Amendment, 26 CONN. L. REV. 521, 561 (1994) (“A post-dispute arbitration agreement is
tantamount to an agreement to allow a neutral to play a role in settling the dispute.”); C. Edward Fletcher,
III, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV.
393, 422 (1987) (“Agreements to arbitrate existing disputes are closely akin to settlement agreements”).
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enforced arbitration awards arising out of unrestricted submissions and thus allowed
parties to depart from correct applications of the law by post-dispute agreements to
arbitrate, much as courts have always allowed parties to depart from correct applications
of the law by post-dispute agreements to settle.
B. 1920’s-1980’s: Enforceable Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
1. Pre-Dispute Privatization, Despite Lower Levels of Consent
As discussed above, pre-1920’s arbitration awards only occurred when both
parties agreed, post-dispute, to arbitrate.24 In contrast, the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”), enacted in 1925, required courts to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements
with the remedy of specific performance, that is, court orders compelling parties to
arbitrate, rather than litigate, their dispute.25 The impact of this change was initially
limited because the FAA was for many years only applied in federal court and very few
states had law similarly enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements.26 However, in the
decades following 1925, nearly every state changed its arbitration law to follow the
FAA’s basic rule of specifically enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements.27 A big
part of this change among the states was the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955.28 Two
years later, the Supreme Court case of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills29 held that
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements are also specifically enforceable.
Lincoln Mills rested its holding on the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, rather
than FAA, which was not cited in a Supreme Court labor arbitration case until 1987.30 In
sum, the three major bodies of arbitration law in the United States (the FAA, state
arbitration law, and labor arbitration law) all shifted during the 1920’s-1980’s period to
enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements with the remedy of specific performance.
In doing so, these bodies of arbitration law broke sharply with the past. No longer
were arbitration awards just arbitrators exercising gap-filling powers delegated to them
by parties’ post-dispute settlement agreements. Under the FAA and its state and labor

24

With the exception of New York and New Jersey which slightly preceded the FAA in enforcing predispute agreements to arbitrate. See MACNEIL, supra note 9, at 34-47.
25

9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4; see, e.g., WARE, supra note 8, at §2.4.

26

WARE, supra note 8, §§ 2.5-2.8.

27

Id.

28

WARE, supra note 8, § 2.5(a).

29

Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957).

30

See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987) (“The Arbitration Act
does not apply to ‘contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,’ 9
U.S.C. § 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases,
especially in the wake of [Lincoln Mills].”).
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parallels, arbitrators were increasingly resolving disputes that one of the parties had
always, and especially post-dispute, wanted resolved in court instead of arbitration.
An example might arise out of the aforementioned form contract prepared by
Seller’s lawyer for all Seller’s sales of goods. Among the form’s thirty clauses stretching
over five pages is a clause requiring Seller and Buyer to arbitrate, rather than litigate, any
dispute arising out of or relating to the transaction. When Buyer signs the form or
otherwise manifests assent to it, Buyer might not read the arbitration clause, let alone
understand it and reflect on it, much less discuss it with counsel or negotiate it with
Seller. Had Buyer been well-informed about arbitration and been given the choice
whether to form the exact same contract without an arbitration clause, Buyer might well
have chosen the no-arbitration option, rather than manifest assent to arbitration along
with the other twenty nine clauses on Seller’s form.
If Buyer pays for the goods and then determines the goods are defective, Buyer
might sue Seller for breach of warranty rather than pursue the warranty claim in
arbitration, (perhaps because Buyer’s lawyer believes Buyer will win more money in
litigation than arbitration). If Seller moves to stay or dismiss Buyer’s suit, a court
applying the FAA or similar state statute will grant that motion and thus compel Buyer to
bring its claim, if at all, in arbitration.31 The arbitrator might rule against Buyer even
though a correct application of warranty law would result in an award for Buyer. Buyer
may then ask a court to vacate the legally-erroneous award on the ground that the
arbitrator did not correctly apply warranty law.
A court applying the FAA or similar state statute is very likely to confirm and
enforce this award without much inquiry into whether the arbitrator correctly applied
warranty law or, as Buyer argues, issued a legally-erroneous award. Countless courts
from the 1920’s to the 1980’s continued the pre-FAA practice of confirming arbitration
awards without determining if the awards correctly applied the law. Although a few
cases during this time period vacated legally-erroneous awards,32 several of these cases
may be read as finding that the awards resolved issues not submitted to the arbitrators,33
or as cases involving restricted submissions.34 Generally, post-1920’s courts (like pre31

WARE, supra note 8, § 2.4(b).

32

Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin, 331 N.W.2d 418, 435 (Mich. 1982) (arbitrators “exceed their
powers” when they commit “errors of law so substantial that, but for such errors, the awards must have
been substantially different.”); id. at 418 (“a reviewing court's ability to review an award is restricted to
cases in which an error of law appears from the face of the award, or the terms of the contract of
submission, or such documentation as the parties agree will constitute the record.”).
33

Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1133 (3d Cir. 1972) (“Whatever [the
agreement’s grant of arbitral] authority may be, it is clear to us that it does not include the authority to
award a six million dollar cash bond to cover a liability which contrary to the requirements of the
applicable breach of warranty clause, has not yet been (and may not be) ‘incurred or suffered,’ in a
situation where the parties did not provide for such security in their agreement, although they might have
done so.”); J. P. Greathouse Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Blount Bros. Const. Co., 374 F.2d 324, 325 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (“As we understand the subcontract, its arbitration clause covers only questions of fact. . . . If the
unexplained award of the arbitrators had any rational basis, they must have decided questions of law. They
thereby exceeded their authority.”); Sammi Line Co., Ltd. v. Altamar Navegacion S.A., 605 F. Supp. 72
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (vacating award of attorneys' fees).
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1920’s courts) stated vacatur rules that turned on whether a submission to arbitration was
restricted or unrestricted. The usual rule from the 1920’s to the 1980’s continued to be
that “unless restricted by the agreement of submission, arbitrators are the final judges of
both law and fact, and an award will not be reviewed or set aside for mistake in either.”35
34

“Sometimes the parties either stipulate that the arbitrator should decide the matter according to a specific
standard, or provide that the law of the jurisdiction shall govern. The courts generally-- even in those
jurisdictions which otherwise strictly limit review on the merits--are quick to upset an award which does
not conform to the stipulation.” Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 681, 688 (1950).
35

The arbitration awards in all the following cases arose out of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate. Pierce
Steel Pile Corp. v. Flannery, 179 A. 558, 561 (Pa. 1935) ("The general rule undoubtedly is that, unless
restricted by the agreement of submission, arbitrators are the final judges of both law and fact, and an
award will not be reviewed or set aside for mistake in either."); Shirley Silk Co. v. Am. Silk Mills, 257
A.D. 375, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939) ("Where the merits of a controversy are referred to an arbitrator
selected by the parties, his determination, either as to the law or the facts, is final and conclusive; and a
court will not open an award unless perverse misconstruction or positive misconduct upon the part of the
arbitrator is plainly established, or there is some provision in the agreement of submission authorizing it.");
Mut. Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n v. United Cas. Co., 142 F.2d 390, 393 (1st Cir. 1944) ("It is well
established in Massachusetts that an arbitration award may not be set aside either for an error of fact or law,
so long as the arbitrator acted in good faith and did not exceed his authority under the terms of the
submission. If the parties submit to an arbitrator for final decision a dispute the settlement of which
requires the construction of a contract or the determination of some other question of law, his decision is
binding notwithstanding that the award may have been based upon an error of law." (citations omitted));
Campe Corp. v. Pac. Mills, 275 A.D. 634, 635 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949) ("In this record no ‘perverse
misconstruction or positive misconduct’ is established plainly or otherwise; nor was there in the submission
any express provision of reservation or restriction. No claim of fraud or corruption is made; nor does it
appear that in making the award the arbitrators exceeded their powers by going outside of or acting
contrary to the contract or the submission. Accordingly, the award is conclusive and may not be reviewed
or set aside for alleged errors of law and fact."); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Columbian Fuel Corp., 165 F.2d
746, 751 (4th Cir. 1948) ("Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters submitted to
them, finally and without appeal. As a mode of settling disputes, it should receive every encouragement
from courts of equity. If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the
arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in
law or fact." (quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344,349 (1854))); Griffith Co. v. San Diego Coll. for
Women, 289 P.2d 476, 484 (Cal. 1955) ("Even if the arbitrator decided this point incorrectly, he did decide
it. . . . Right or wrong the parties have contracted that such a decision should be conclusive. At most, it is
an error of law, not reviewable by the courts."); Gaddis Min. Co. v. Cont'l Materials Corp., 196 F.Supp.
860, 864 (D. Wyo. 1961) ("In Colorado, an arbitration award is not subject to review in the courts merely
because one of the parties is dissatisfied with it, or solely for mistake in either the law or fact….The
arbitrators are the final judges of the law and fact, and the court will not substitute its judgment for that of
the arbitrators."); Mars Constructors, Inc. v. Tropical Enters., Ltd., 460 P.2d 317, 319 (Haw. 1969)
(“assuming that the arbitrators here erred in construing the construction contract, a mistake in the
application of law and in their findings of fact, this mistake is not one of the three grounds specified [in the
state statute for vacatur of the award], and the circuit court correctly ruled that it was powerless to modify
or correct the award."); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Am. Arb. Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 252 (9th Cir. 1973) (“The
'correctness' of the arbitrator's rulings is not a proper concern of the reviewing court….An arbitration award
must be upheld unless it be shown that there was partiality on the part of an arbitrator, or that the arbitrator
exceeded his authority, or that the award was rendered in 'manifest disregard of the law.'” (citations
omitted)); Gallagher v. Educator & Exec. Insurers, Inc., 381 A.2d 986 (Pa. Super 1977) ("In arbitration
governed by common-law principles, arbitrators are final judges of both fact and law and award is not
subject to judicial review for mistakes of either."); MCT Shipping Corp. v. Sabet, 497 F. Supp. 1078, 108283 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("Where an arbitration award has a basis which can be rationally inferred, the award

68

In other words, post-1920’s courts have generally been quite willing to enforce
legally-erroneous awards arising out of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate. This
willingness effectively treats the pre-dispute agreement as the parties’ contracting out of
otherwise-applicable law (warranty law in Buyer’s case,) and substituting in its place
whatever law, (including trade custom or the arbitrator’s own sense of equity), the
arbitrator uses.36 This can be called “pre-dispute privatization”—opting out of otherwiseapplicable law through enforceable pre-dispute agreements to comply with the
arbitrator’s decision regardless of whether it correctly applies that law.
This pre-dispute privatization cannot be justified on the ground that justified preFAA courts enforcing legally-erroneous awards. As discussed above, pre-FAA courts
could enforce legally-erroneous awards on the ground that doing so was merely enforcing
post-dispute settlement agreements that delegated to arbitrators the task of filling gaps in
their settlement terms; and courts have always enforced settlement agreements without
asking whether their results match, or even remotely approximate, the results a court
would have reached after litigation.37
This eagerness to enforce settlements, as noted above, seems due to the high level
of consent generally attendant to agreements formed post-dispute, because parties to postdispute agreements tend to be advised by counsel and focused on a specific alreadyarisen dispute. In contrast, Buyer in this 1920’s to 1980’s example did not agree to
arbitrate post-dispute. Buyer agreed to arbitrate pre-dispute by manifesting assent to a
form contract and probably did so without the benefit of counsel and without much

must be upheld unless a statutory ground for vacating the award under 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970) exists. . . .
Absent a showing of 'manifest disregard of the law,' an award must be upheld even if the arbitrator
misinterpreted the law or the facts." (citations omitted)); Dundas Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd. v.
Stravelakis Bros., Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 1000, 1003-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("It is not the function of a district
court to review the record of an arbitration proceeding for mere errors of law or fact." (citations omitted));
Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v. Israel, 689 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1982) ("An arbitrator's paramount
responsibility is to reach an equitable result, and the courts will not assume the role of overseers to mold
the award to conform to their sense of justice. Thus, an arbitrator's award will not be vacated for errors of
law and fact committed by the arbitrator." (quoting Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 389 N.E.2d 456, 458 (N.Y.
1979)).
36

Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 703, 711-12 (1999).
While an arbitration agreement contracts out of all the law that would have been
applied by a court, that law may still be applied by the arbitrator. The arbitrator
may even apply that law more aggressively than a court would have.
Contracting out of law through arbitration agreements does not necessarily mean
that such law will be under-enforced in the sense that plaintiffs “do worse” in
arbitration than they would have done in court. In some cases, arbitrators reach a
more “pro-plaintiff” result than a court would have reached; in others, arbitrators
reach a more “pro-defendant” result than a court would have reached. We
cannot know which of these deviations occurs more often.
Id. at 711-12.
37

Id. at 711.
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attention, if any, to the arbitration clause.38 In short, the high levels of consent typically
justifying post-dispute privatization do not justify pre-dispute privatization, which arises
out of agreements typically formed with much lower levels of consent.39
Nevertheless, courts applying the FAA and similar state statutes are right to
enforce pre-dispute privatization—that is, right to treat Buyer’s agreement to arbitrate as
contracting out of warranty law and substituting instead whatever law, custom, or sense
of equity, the arbitrator chooses. That is because the FAA’s list of grounds for vacatur
does not include error of law by the arbitrator.40 The FAA permits courts to vacate:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means;
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made.41
These grounds for vacatur do not include arbitral error of law so courts applying the FAA
and similar state statutes are right, with exceptions noted below, 42 to confirm and enforce
awards without considering whether the awards are legally-correct or legally-erroneous.
For example, a court applying the FAA or similar state statute would be right to treat
Buyer’s agreement to arbitrate (unless that agreement says otherwise 43) as contracting out
of warranty law and substituting instead whatever law, custom, or sense of equity, the
arbitrator chooses.

38

See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.

39

This is a generalization about pre-dispute arbitration agreements. In some particular pre-dispute
agreements, the arbitration clause may be the subject of negotiation between the parties and a high-level of
consent.
40

See generally Gaitis, supra note 15, at 5 (“under ‘unrestricted’ arbitration submissions, arbitrators should
be deemed to be authorized to intentionally disregard applicable law should they so choose”).
41

9 U.S.C. § 10(a).

42

See discussion infra Part IV.D.1-2.

43

See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
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2. Claims Arising out of Default Rules Contrasted with Claims Arising out
of Mandatory Rules of Law
The previous subsection concluded that courts applying the FAA and similar state
statutes are right to treat Buyer’s agreement to arbitrate as contracting out of warranty
law and substituting instead whatever law, custom, or sense of equity, the arbitrator
chooses. However, this conclusion fits comfortably into our broader legal system only
insofar as the relevant warranty law consists of default rules.44 A default rule is one that
governs unless the parties contract out of it. In contrast, a mandatory rule is one that
governs despite a contract term to the contrary, that is, a rule that cannot be avoided by
contract.45 Enforcing arbitration agreements to effectuate pre-dispute privatization of
otherwise-mandatory law is troubling because it enables parties using pre-dispute
arbitration agreements to avoid law that non-arbitration law says is not avoidable by pre44

I proposed this distinction between claims arising out of mandatory and default law in a 1999 law review
article, Ware, supra note 36, which focused on domestic arbitration. In the same year, Phillip
McConnaughay published an excellent article which, although focused on international arbitration, made
similar arguments based on this distinction. See Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of
Lawlessness: A “Second Look” at International Commercial Arbitration, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 514–15
(1999) (“Achieving the compliance objectives of mandatory U.S. law – at least to the extent those
objectives remain achievable in a private arbitral context – would require courts to refuse recognition or
enforcement of a mandatory law award unless the award was both (1) rendered pursuant to arbitral
procedures and rules of discovery and evidence closely approximating those that would have applied had
the mandatory law claim been resolved in U.S. court, and (2) demonstrably correct.”)
Others, often writing on international arbitration, have also used the distinction between claims arising
out of mandatory and default law in recommending different approaches to judicial review of arbitration
awards. See Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49
DUKE L.J. 1279, 1281 (2000) (“existing rules governing judicial review of arbitral decisions are not only
inadequate to ensure that mandatory rules are applied, but they actually encourage arbitrators to ignore such
rules”; recommending that the losing party in an arbitration be able to sue the arbitrator on the ground that a
mandatory rule was ignored); Eric A. Posner, Arbitration and Harmonization of International Commercial
Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 647, 651 (1999) (“The dilemma can be stated succinctly.
If domestic courts enforce arbitration awards, rather than subjecting them to de novo review, arbitrators will
ignore local mandatory rules. However, if courts subject arbitration awards to de novo review in order to
ensure that mandatory rules are respected, the benefits of arbitration – predictability, neutrality, and
minimization of litigation cost – are lost.” “The main contribution of the paper is a proof that the optimal
strategy of courts, under plausible conditions, is to engage in random de novo review of arbitration
decisions”). Catherine Rogers says “anxiety over arbitrators applying mandatory law has become
something of a mania, often producing extreme proposals.” Catherine A. Rogers, Context and Institutional
Structure in Attorney Regulation: Constructing an Enforcement Regime for International Arbitration, 39
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 53 n.282 (2003) (citing Guzman, supra note 44, at 1316).
On the more general topic of mandatory rules in international arbitration, see GUIDETTA CORDERO
MOSS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: PARTY AUTONOMY AND MANDATORY RULES (1999).
45

One can identify which laws are default and which are mandatory by examining the sorts of contract
terms that are, and are not, enforceable. For example, the legal rule that the place for delivery in a sale of
goods is the seller’s place of business is a default rule because parties can make an enforceable contract
requiring delivery at some other location. U.C.C. § 2-308 (2012). In contrast, the legal rule giving a
consumer the right that goods purchased not be “in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user” is mandatory because it applies no matter what the contract terms say. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A, comment m. (1975). See generally Richard C. Ausness, “Waive” Goodbye to Tort Liability: A
Proposal to Remove Paternalism from Product Sales Transactions, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 293 (2000).
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dispute agreement.46 This is troubling even to my libertarianism which, as noted above,
generally holds that if parties do not want to be governed by a particular set of laws then
they should be free to make enforceable contracts opting out of those laws and into
whatever alternatives they choose. “I believe candor and logical consistency require
those of us who oppose mandatory law to seek to repeal it outright, not to use arbitration
to make an end run around it.”47
While enforcing arbitration agreements to effectuate pre-dispute privatization of
otherwise-mandatory law is troubling because it enables parties using pre-dispute
arbitration agreements to avoid law that non-arbitration law says is it not avoidable by
pre-dispute agreement, that is not true of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims
arising under default rules of law. Enforcing arbitration agreements to effectuate predispute privatization of default law is entirely consistent with the pre-dispute
privatization long allowed by non-arbitration law because the arbitrator is merely
resolving questions that the parties could have resolved when they formed the (predispute) contract. In resolving claims under default law, the arbitrator is resolving
questions that arise because the parties chose to draft their contract in broad, general
terms, rather than detailed, specific terms.
For example, a warranty in a sale of wood might say only that the goods are
“hardwood” and a dispute may require the arbitrator to decide whether particular pieces
of oak qualify as sufficiently hard. The parties could have resolved this question
themselves by, for instance, requiring the wood meet a minimum score on the Janka
hardness test.48 Either type of contract effectuates pre-dispute privatization of warranty
law. The latter contract (e.g., “Janka score over 10,000 Newtons”) involves specific
lawmaking by the parties, while the former contract involves general lawmaking by the
parties (“hardwood”) and then specific lawmaking by the parties’ agent, the arbitrator.49
So long as enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements and legally-erroneous
arbitration awards arising out of them was confined to default law, then pre-dispute
arbitration agreements were privatizing within the same bounds that other more-specific
contracts privatize.
From the 1920’s until the 1980’s, enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements and legally-erroneous awards arising out of them was limited almost
46

This point has both empirical and jurisprudential dimensions. See infra note 91.

47

“As an aside, I feel compelled to add that I oppose much of the mandatory law enacted since the FAA so
I am sort of pleased that arbitration now allows parties to opt out such law. But I believe candor and logical
consistency require those of us who oppose mandatory law to seek to repeal it outright, not to use
arbitration to make an end run around it.” Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, in EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J.
WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 117 n.93 (2006).
48

Or even to specify in the agreement “the amount of pounds-force (lbf) or newtons (N) required to imbed
a .444″ (11.28 mm) diameter steel ball into the wood to half the ball’s diameter.” Eric Meier, Top Ten
Hardest Woods, W OOD D ATABASE , http://www.wood-database.com/wood-articles/top-ten-hardest-woods/.
49

As Judge Easterbrook wrote for the Seventh Circuit, “In the main, an arbitrator acts as the parties’ agent
and as their delegate may do anything the parties may do directly.” George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany
and Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001).
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completely to claims arising under default rules,50 particularly breach-of-contract
claims—in which I include breach-of-warranty claims. As late as 1985, a United States
Supreme Court Justice (Stevens) could refer to “the undisputed historical fact that
arbitration has functioned almost entirely in either the area of labor disputes or in
‘ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of fact.’”51 Arbitrators in these two
contexts hear almost nothing but breach-of-contract claims. In the labor context, a union
or employee asserts breach of a collective bargaining agreement. 52 In the commercial
context, merchants allege breach of contracts for the sale of goods and raise “questions of
fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of payment, excuses for
non-performance, and the like.”53 Buyer’s warranty claim in the example above is
perhaps the classic example of disputes arbitrated before the 1980’s: a business-tobusiness sale of goods in which the law resolving the dispute matters little as precedent
for other parties because each dispute turns on narrow, fact-specific questions about
whether the particular goods Buyer received conformed to the particular warranties Seller
made.54
By excluding mandatory law claims from enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, 1920’s – 1980’s arbitration law kept the privatizing effects of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements within the law’s bounds restricting the extent to which other predispute contracts could privatize. Under this coherent view of arbitration law’s place in
our broader legal system, a court enforcing an arbitration award is a court enforcing a
contract. The parties agreed to comply with the arbitrator’s decision and if a party
refuses to do so (even before the court confirms the award) then that party is in breach of
contract. Just as courts routinely enforce most other sorts of contracts without assessing
the wisdom of the contract’s terms, so courts routinely enforce arbitration awards without
assessing the wisdom of the award’s terms.
However, not all contracts are enforceable and, similarly, not all arbitration
awards are enforceable. Just as contract law has long recognized defenses to contract
enforcement, arbitration law has long recognized defenses to the enforcement of an
arbitration award. Contract law’s defenses include fraud, mistake, duress, undue
influence, unconscionability, and illegality. These generally resemble the FAA’s grounds
for vacating an arbitration award. FAA § 10(a)(1)’s “corruption, fraud, or undue means”
resembles contract law’s defenses of illegality, fraud, undue influence and duress. FAA §
10(a)(2)’s “partiality or corruption” and § 10(a)(3)’s “misconduct” or “misbehavior”
resemble contract law’s defenses of unconscionability, illegality and undue influence.
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Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
By State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 563 (2009) (“Over the centuries, the scope of
arbitrable claims was limited to those over which the parties had contractual power, which includes
statutory provisions subject to waiver (default rules), but not mandatory rules.”).
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See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 646 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
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See WARE, supra note 8, at § 2.53(b).
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See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 646 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).

54

Other transactions involve other goods and warranties vary from case to case as parties in business-tobusiness sales generally have the freedom to choose what warranties, if any, to put in their contract terms.
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Subsection 4’s “exceeded ... powers” or “imperfectly executed them” resembles contract
law’s defenses of illegality and mistake.
In sum, the 1920’s-1980s distinction between pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
claims arising under default law (enforceable) and mandatory law (not enforceable) fit
the FAA’s vacatur provisions which generally aim to ensure that arbitral awards conform
to the arbitration agreement, as opposed to ensuring that they conform to law “external”
to that agreement. As Judge Richard Posner later wrote for the Seventh Circuit:
It is tempting to think that courts are engaged in judicial review of
arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, but they are
not. When parties agree to arbitrate their disputes they opt out of
the court system, and when one of them challenges the resulting
arbitration award he perforce does so not on the ground that the
arbitrators made a mistake but that they violated the agreement to
arbitrate, . . . conduct to which the parties did not consent when
they included an arbitration clause in their contract.55
In other words, the FAA does not make “error of law” a ground for vacatur because it
was written for a world in which arbitrators are not necessarily supposed to apply the law.
The FAA’s grounds for vacatur were apparently written for a world in which arbitrators
are supposed to apply the contract. In short, the dominant understanding of arbitrators
from the 1920’s to the 1980’s seems to be that they were bound by contract, rather than
by law “external” to the contract.
3. Similarities and Differences between Commercial Arbitration and
Labor Arbitration
As the previous section explained, the fact that from the 1920’s until the 1980’s
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements was limited almost completely to
breach-of-contract claims helped justify courts of the era in confirming and enforcing
arbitration awards without asking whether the award correctly applied the law—that is,
helped justify enforcing legally-erroneous awards. Courts’ justification for enforcing
legally-erroneous awards was, however, more explicit and insightful in labor arbitration
law than in the commercial arbitration law of the FAA and its state counterparts. In
justifying their enforcement of legally-erroneous awards, commercial cases tended to cite
only the efficiency justifications of saving time and money. For example, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court justified confirming an award without determining its legal
correctness by noting that “a contrary holding would mean that arbitration proceedings,
instead of being a quick and easy mode of obtaining justice, would be merely an
unnecessary step in the course of litigation, causing delay and expense, but settling
nothing finally.”56
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Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Pierce Steel Pile Corp. v. Flannery, 179 A. 558, 561 (Pa. 1935). A later Supreme Court commercial
arbitration case also emphasized saving time and money as the benefits of confirming legally-erroneous
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While it is true that arbitration’s ability to save time and money is furthered by
courts confirming legally-erroneous awards,57 exclusive focus on these cost-savings
omits the deeper justification for enforcing legally-erroneous awards. That deeper
justification is the libertarian argument mentioned above—parties should be free to make
enforceable contracts opting out of governmentally-enacted laws and into law created by
their own private legal systems.58 As I wrote many years ago, arbitration
allows parties to privatize law. This has important benefits.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical trade association—the
Widget Dealers Association. The Widget Dealers Association
could require, as a condition of membership in the Association,
that all members agree to arbitrate all their disputes with each
other. The arbitrators would be widget dealers, themselves. These
arbitrators, unlike judges or jurors, would know and respect the
norms and customs of the widget industry. The arbitrators would
be inclined to decide cases in accord with these norms and customs
and could even be contractually required to do so. Alternatively the
Widget Dealers Association might choose to codify some of its
norms and customs by creating written rules that would amount to
awards. See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (reading the FAA “as
substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. Any other reading opens the door to the
full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more
cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process and bring arbitration theory to grief in postarbitration process.”).
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Confirming legally-erroneous awards increases the finality of the arbitrator’s decision and thus reduces
costs to the parties and to the court system. See Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come:
Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 592
(2007) (“[L]imited appellate review encourages finality and discourages parties from pursuing dubious,
costly appeals.”); Jackson Williams & Morgan Lynn, Public Citizen Releases the Costs of Arbitration, 9
PIABA B.J. 49, 52 (2002) (“Public Citizen agrees that proponents of arbitration are undoubtedly correct
that the limited, narrow grounds upon which an arbitration award can be appealed will reduce litigation
costs. Parties will avoid paying court reporters to record or transcribe hearings or appellate attorneys to
write briefs.”).In contrast, if courts reviewed awards for errors of law, more parties disappointed with their
arbitration awards could be expected to challenge those awards in court. See Abbott v. Mulligan, 647
F.Supp.2d 1286,1291-92 (D. Utah 2009) (“If a misinterpretation or misapplication of the law was a
sufficient basis upon which a district court could overturn an arbitration panel’s ruling, district courts
would become routine avenues for appeal every time a plausible argument could be made that the
arbitration panel got the law wrong. An appeal to the district court would be virtually guaranteed if one of
the parties felt they had grounds to argue that the arbitrators got the law really wrong. Such review would
defeat the rationale and purposes behind the FAA.”)
In addition to the costs of those challenges themselves, attempts to vacate awards on that basis might
also make the underlying arbitration process more expensive. Currently, arbitrators in many cases do not
write reasoned opinions explaining their decisions, nor is there typically a transcript or other record of the
arbitration hearing. These cost-saving aspects of arbitration might have to change if courts vacated awards
lacking a basis on which the court could assure itself that the arbitrator correctly applied the law.
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See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text
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privately-created statutes. The arbitrators could then be
contractually required to decide cases in accord with these written
rules.
Not only can agreements require arbitrators to apply rules,
agreements can require arbitrators to write reasoned opinions. As
the Widget Dealers Association arbitrators build a supply of
precedents, they can be contractually required to follow precedents
in future cases. So the privately-created law consists of not only
unwritten norms and/or written rules, but also decisional law. In
short, arbitration can produce a sophisticated, comprehensive legal
system. Even better, it can produce many such systems. The law—
unwritten norms, written rules and decisional law—of the Widget
Dealers Association may differ from the law of the Gadget Dealers
Association. Both may differ from the laws of the Sierra Club, the
Alabama Baptist Convention, the American Association of Retired
People, the Rotary Club, or the Saab Owners Association. Thus
emerges privatized law in the fullest sense. There is diversity
because what is best for some is not best for others. But there is
also a process of experimentation in which lawmakers learn from
each other and copy laws which seem better. There may even be
open competition among different lawmakers to earn money by
producing better laws. A market for law develops. This privatized
system produces better law than does a system in which
government monopolizes lawmaking. The principles animating
privatization around the world apply to lawmaking just as they
apply to coal mining or mail delivery.
This vision, or even anything approximating it, is not to be found in commercial
arbitration cases. Leading commercial arbitration cases do not acknowledge, let alone
bless, arbitration’s central role in privately-created law as a justification for courts
enforcing arbitration awards without determining if the arbitrator correctly applied
governmentally-created law.
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s labor arbitration cases come close to doing just
that. The Supreme Court’s labor cases expressly cite arbitration’s central role in private
legal systems as the main justification for courts enforcing arbitration awards without
determining if the arbitrator correctly applied the law. This is especially prominent in the
Supreme Court’s 1960 “Steelworkers Trilogy.” As the Supreme Court said in one of the
Steelworkers cases,
A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of
industrial self government.... Gaps may be left to be filled in by
reference to the practices of the particular industry and of the
various shops covered by the agreement. Many of the specific
practices which underlie the agreement may be unknown, except in
hazy form, even to the negotiators ... [The arbitration] grievance
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machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very
heart of the system of industrial self government. Arbitration is the
means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private
law for all the problems which may arise and to provide for their
solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant
needs and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes
through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which
meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining
agreement. 59
On this view, contract terms are privately-created law and the lawmakers (the
parties) have delegated to their agent (the arbitrator) the power to interpret and apply their
law, the contract’s terms.60 Adopting this view, Supreme Court labor cases repeatedly
emphasized that courts should not substitute their own judgment for that of the arbitrators
on the legal question in most labor arbitration, which is contract interpretation. “[T]he
question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a question for the
arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as the
arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business
overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.”61 “The
refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.”62
In sum, the Supreme Court’s Steelworkers cases extolled the virtues of predispute privatization through arbitration. These cases celebrated parties’ ability, though
arbitration, to create a “system of private law,” a “self-government,” if courts enforce
both pre-dispute arbitration agreements and resulting awards even if the awards are
legally-erroneous. This celebration of pre-dispute privatization-by-arbitration, it should
be emphasized, occurred in the context of claims arising under default law, contract
interpretation.
4. No Pre-Dispute-Privatization of Claims Arising Under Mandatory Law
In contrast, the Supreme Court of the 1920’s to 1980’s era did not support predispute privatization of claims arising under mandatory law. While commercial and
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United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-81 (1960).
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As a later Supreme Court case said, “we must treat the arbitrator's award as if it represented an agreement
between Eastern and the union as to the proper meaning of the contract's words ‘just cause.’ For present
purposes, the award is not distinguishable from the contractual agreement.” E. Associated Coal Corp. v.
United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000). See also George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany and Co., 248
F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001) (“In the main, an arbitrator acts as the parties’ agent and as their delegate
may do anything the parties may do directly.”).
61

Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
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Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596.
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labor disputes are largely governed by default rules that is not true of other areas of law.63
For example, statutes designed to protect consumers, investors, and employees often
consist of rules parties cannot alter or avoid by pre-dispute contract.64 Indeed, an
important purpose of these statutes is often to protect consumers, investors, and
employees from contract terms unfavorable to them.65 Before the 1980’s, pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate such mandatory law claims were unenforceable. In other words,
such claims were not arbitrable. Examples of non-arbitrable claims included securities,66
employment discrimination,67 antitrust,68 RICO,69 patent,70 copyright,71 “non-core”
bankruptcy proceedings,72 and ERISA.73
63

See Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J.
449 (2005).
Finally, in thinking about judicial review [of arbitration] on matters of “law” we
must of course distinguish between mere rules of construction --which come
into play in the absence of a contrary agreement -- and mandatory rules. After
all, most “rules” of contract or commercial law are nothing more than “gapfillers,” Supplying a term where the parties have not expressly supplied one
themselves. These “general rules of law” “hold” only when there is no
“common understanding” that is directly furnished by the parties themselves –
or which can be found in the background, of usage and prior conduct, against
which they have dealtwith each other. Where, however, the parties have
bargained for dispute resolution through arbitration, the particular method they
have chosen to fill any gaps – to determine their “common understanding” – is
the arbitrator’s interpretation. His construction is their bargain. In contrast, legal
“rules” in other areas may reflect stronger and overriding governmental or
societal interests. In such cases, obviously, some greater degree of arbitral
deference should be expected.
Id. at 521.
64

Horton, supra note 20, at 747 (citing Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer
Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 207-09 (1998)
(collecting examples)) (“consumer, employment, and landlord-tenant law is littered with non-disclaimable
rights and duties, from usury laws to warranties of habitability.”).
65

David S. Schwartz, Claim Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 252 (2012) (“these
statutes all arose to regulate the overreaching party in a one-sided transaction [so it would be] perverse to
allow that regulated party to choose dispute resolution rules that it deemed advantageous”).
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See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
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Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding Title VII claims inarbitrable);
Nicholson v. CPC Int’l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 231 (3rd Cir. 1989) (holding ADEA claims inarbitrable). In
addition, a Supreme Court labor arbitration case of this era, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974), did not even support post-dispute privatization of a mandatory law claim. In Gardner-Denver an
employee brought his Title VII race discrimination in arbitration and the arbitrator ruled against the
employee. The Supreme Court denied enforcement to the award by allowing the employee to bring the
same Title VII claim in court. Gardner-Denver was based on the rationale that an employee’s rights under
Title VII are not “susceptible of prospective waiver” and that an arbitration agreement is such a waiver. Id.
at 52. In other words, Title VII is mandatory law and Gardner- Denver refused to enforce a pre-dispute
agreement to contract around mandatory law.
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The 1953 Supreme Court case holding securities claims inarbitrable, Wilko v.
Swan, specifically connected this holding to the challenges facing a party seeking vacatur
of an award that did not correctly apply the Securities Act.
While it may be true, as the Court of Appeals thought, that a
failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the
provisions of the Securities Act would ‘constitute grounds for
vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal
Arbitration Act,’ that failure would need to be made clearly to
appear. In unrestricted submission, such as the present margin
agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the
federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation. The
United States Arbitration Act [FAA] contains no provision for
judicial determination of legal issues such as is found in the
English law. As the protective provisions of the Securities Act
require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their
effectiveness, it seems to us that Congress must have intended [the
Securities Act’s non-waiver provision] to apply [and bar] waiver of
judicial trial and review.74
While various courts and scholars have read Wilko differently,75 the Court clearly stated
its view that substituting arbitration for litigation requires parties “to accept less certainty
68

See, e.g., Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1968) (declaring
antitrust claims “inappropriate for arbitration”); but see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985) (holding an agreement to arbitrate a claim arising under the
Sherman Antitrust Act enforceable).
69

See Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 298-300 (1st Cir. 1986).
“RICO” is an abbreviation for “Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(2006).
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See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970).
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See Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 522 F.Supp. 125, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 684
F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982).
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See Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, 712 F.2d 55, 59 (3rd Cir. 1983). But see Hays & Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1155 (3d Cir. 1989) (overruling and holding that noncore bankruptcy proceedings are arbitrable). A core proceeding involves “the administration of the estate;
the allowance of claims against the estate; the voidance of preferences or fraudulent transfers;
determinations as to dischargeability of debts; priorities of liens; or the confirmation of a plan. . . .” Id. at
1156 n.9. Core proceedings are generally not arbitrable. See generally In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d 631
(2d Cir. 1999).
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See Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 941 (3d Cir. 1985).

74

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
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of legally correct” decisions.76 A pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate—and thus to reduce
the certainly of a legally correct decision—conflicted, the 1953 Court held, with the
mandatory law provision of the Securities Act.77 Wilko rejected pre-dispute privatization
of claims arising under mandatory law.
In addition, a Supreme Court labor arbitration case of this era, Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,78 prohibited even post-dispute privatization of a mandatory law
claim. In Gardner-Denver an employee brought his Title VII race discrimination claim
in arbitration and the arbitrator ruled against the employee.79 The Supreme Court denied
enforcement to the award as the Court allowed the employee to bring the same Title VII
claim in court.80 Gardner-Denver was based on the rationale that “an employee’s rights
under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver” and that an arbitration
agreement is such a waiver.81 In other words, Title VII is mandatory law and Gardner
Denver refused to enforce a pre-dispute agreement to contract around mandatory law.
To recap, arbitration law from the 1920’s into the 1980’s largely conformed to the
distinction between default law and mandatory law. While courts did not enforce predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising out of mandatory law, courts enforced predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising out of default law and enforced awards on
such claims without determining whether the arbitrator correctly applied the default law.
In short, between the 1920’s and 1980’s arbitration law moved to allowing pre-dispute
privatization of claims arising out of default law but did not allow pre-dispute
privatization of claims arising out of mandatory law.
C. Late-1980’s-2008: Enforceable Pre-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate Claims
Arising out of Mandatory Law and Resulting Movement toward Vacating
Legally-Erroneous Awards
1. Enforcing Pre-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate Claims Arising Under
Mandatory Law
While pre-1980’s courts did not enforce agreements to arbitrate claims arising
under mandatory law, from 1985 to 1991 the Supreme Court decided cases in which it
held that several important mandatory law claims (securities, antitrust and employment
75

See Gaitis, supra note 15.
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Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
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In contrast, “if courts generally maintained authority to review the legal reasoning underlying an arbitral
award, the arbitration of securities claims arguably would not result in a waiver of the legal protections
guaranteed by the Securities Act.” Gaitis, supra note 15, at 8.
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Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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Id. at 43.
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Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60.

81

Id. at 51-52.
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discrimination) were arbitrable.82 Since that time, the Court has consistently held that the
FAA
mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.
Like any statutory directive, the [FAA]’s mandate may be
overridden by a contrary congressional command. The burden is
on the party opposing arbitration, however, to show that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue .... If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver
of a judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent will be
deducible from [the statute’s] text or legislative history, ... or from
an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s
underlying purposes.83
Since first making a statement to this effect in 1985,84 the Supreme Court has yet
to discover a single instance in which “Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” In other words, the Supreme Court has (for
almost 30 years) consistently found that statutory claims are arbitrable.85
The 1985-1991 expansion of arbitrability to mandatory law claims was, I believe,
a proper interpretation of the FAA.86 However, this expansion of arbitrability to
mandatory law claims created a problem because it expanded arbitration’s pre-dispute
privatization beyond the bounds permitted of other pre-dispute contracts.
An example might arise out of a form contract prepared by Employer’s lawyer for
all of Employer’s new employees. Among the form’s thirty clauses stretching over five
pages is a clause requiring Employer and Employee to arbitrate, rather than litigate, any
dispute arising out of or relating to the employment relationship. When Employee signs
82

See MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 10. The important cases were Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)(antitrust); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)(Securities Exchange Act and RICO); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)(Securities Act); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991)(employment discrimination). Their predecessor was Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506 (1974), but it stood alone for over a decade and seemed narrowly confined to the special concerns
of international cases.
83

McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27.
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Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628 (“Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be
held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue.”).
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Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614 (antitrust); McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (Securities Exchange Act
and RICO); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477 (Securities Act); Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 (employment
discrimination); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (Credit Repair Organization
Act),
86

FAA section 2 requires courts to enforce, not merely agreements to arbitrate breach-of-contract claims,
but agreements to arbitrate any “controversy” “arising out of [the parties’] contract or transaction.” 9
U.S.C. § 2.
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the form or otherwise manifests assent to it, Employee might not read the arbitration
clause, let alone understand it and reflect on it, much less discuss it with counsel or
negotiate it with Employer. Had Employee been well-informed about arbitration and
been given the choice whether to form the exact same contract without an arbitration
clause, Employee might well have chosen the no-arbitration option, rather than manifest
assent to arbitration along with the other twenty nine clauses on Employer’s form.
If Employee is denied a promotion due to her race or sex, Employee might sue
Employer for discrimination rather than pursue the discrimination claim in arbitration,
(perhaps because Employee’s lawyer believes Employee will win more money in
litigation than arbitration). If Employer moves to stay or dismiss Employee’s suit, a court
applying the Supreme Court’s 1985-1991 arbitrability cases (particularly Gilmer87) will
grant that motion and thus compel Employee to bring her claim, if at all, in arbitration.
The arbitrator might rule against Employee even though a correct application of
employment-discrimination law would result in an award for Employee. Employee may
then ask a court to vacate the legally-erroneous award on the ground that the arbitrator
did not correctly apply discrimination law.
The facts of this post-1980’s employment example are identical to the facts of the
1920’s-1980's Buyer-Seller example except that this is an employment discrimination
claim while the earlier example was a warranty claim. The distinction between
employment-discrimination claims and warranty claims is important because employees'
rights to be free of discrimination are protected by mandatory rules. In other words, predispute agreements to waive rights under the employment discrimination statutes are not
enforceable.88 Similarly, a pre-dispute agreement to waive one’s rights under the
antitrust89 or securities90 statutes would not be enforceable. But a pre-dispute agreement
to arbitrate these claims is effectively a waiver of one’s rights under these statutes if
arbitration awards including errors of law that fail to vindicate such rights are confirmed
87

Richard C. Reuben, FAA Law, Without the Activism: What If the Bellwether Cases Were Decided by a
Truly Conservative Court?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 883, 910 (2012) (“In Gilmer, the Supreme Court
effectively upheld the validity of mandatory arbitration clauses in standard form contracts. It was the coda
on a remarkable about-face by the Court on the issue of whether arbitration could be used to deny parties
access to the public courts for statutory claims.”).
88

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 42, 51 (1974) (“it [is] clear that there can be no
prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII.”); MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 499 (1988).
89

David Horton, Mass Arbitration and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 459, 499 (2014) (“a
venerable line of authority holds that parties cannot prospectively relinquish their ability to sue under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts.” (citing Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 896 n.27
(3d Cir. 1975); Redel's Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 99 (5th Cir. 1974); Gaines v. Carrollton
Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 386 F.2d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 1967); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry &
Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 250 (7th Cir. 1995); Fox Midwest Theatres v. Means, 221 F.2d 173, 180 (8th
Cir. 1955))).
90

See 15 U.S.C. §77n (2006) (Securities Act anti-waiver provision); id. §77cc(a) (Securities Exchange Act
anti-waiver provision: “Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance
with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory
organization, shall be void.”).
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and enforced by courts.91 In other words, the longstanding rule that “arbitrators are the
final judges of both law and fact, and an award will not be reviewed or set aside for
mistake in either”92 is in much tension with the Supreme Court’s 1985-1991 assertion
that “the streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction
on substantive rights.”93
Perhaps to resolve this tension, when the Supreme Court began enforcing predispute agreements to arbitrate mandatory law claims, it began saying that “judicial
scrutiny of arbitration awards...is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute”94 giving rise to the mandatory-law claim asserted in
arbitration, e.g., the Securities Exchange Act or the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. In other words, the Court perhaps hinted that its 1985-1991 change to enforcing
executory agreements to arbitrate mandatory law claims required a change to the
longstanding rule against judicially-reviewing arbitrators’ rulings on questions of law.

91

An alternative view is that only “An arbitration process with a biased decision maker - at the extreme, an
arbitrator who will always rule in favor of one of the parties without regard to the merits of the case - is
indistinguishable from a provision waiving the substantive claim at issue.” Christopher R. Drahozal, Why
Arbitrate? Substantive Versus Procedural Theories of Private Judging, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 163, 177
(2011). I do not believe any inquiry into the likelihood of an arbitrator ruling against the substantive claim
at issue is needed to conclude that an arbitration agreement is “indistinguishable from a provision waiving”
that claim. As noted above,
While an arbitration agreement contracts out of all the law that would have been
applied by a court, that law may still be applied by the arbitrator. The arbitrator
may even apply that law more aggressively than a court would have.
Contracting out of law through arbitration agreements does not necessarily mean
that such law will be under-enforced in the sense that plaintiffs “do worse” in
arbitration than they would have done in court. In some cases, arbitrators reach a
more “pro-plaintiff” result than a court would have reached; in others, arbitrators
reach a more “pro-defendant” result than a court would have reached. We
cannot know which of these deviations occurs more often.
See Ware supra note 36, at 711-12. If with respect to some particular mandatory law right, arbitrators are
more likely than courts to rule for plaintiffs then from an empirical perspective it might seem strange to
characterize an arbitration agreement as a waiver of that right. But from a jurisprudential perspective, a
waiver it is. That is because in those rare cases arbitration awards make errors of law depriving the
claimant of her right then a rights-violation has occurred. In contrast, when a court makes an error of law
depriving a claimant of her right then she can appeal to a higher court which will correct the law and thus
vindicate the right. And if the highest available court does not correct the error then it was not an error
because, ultimately, the law is whatever the highest available court says it is.
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Pierce Steel Pile Corp. v. Flannery, 179 A. 558, 561 (Pa. 1935).
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Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
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Id. Accord 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269 n.10 (2009) (quotation omitted); Accord
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4 (1991) (quotation omitted).
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2. Post-1991 Movement toward Vacating Legally-Erroneous Awards
I believe the Supreme Court’s 1985-1991 decisions enforcing pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate mandatory law claims led some courts toward vacating legallyerroneous awards. To put it another way, I believe the Supreme Court’s 1985-1991
decisions enforcing pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate mandatory law claims reduced
judicial comfort with the longstanding rule that courts should not review arbitration
awards for errors of law.95 As enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
expanded from breach-of-contract claims to mandatory law claims like antitrust,
securities, and especially employment discrimination, the FAA’s contractually-oriented
grounds for vacatur did not fit an increasing number of awards.96
As I wrote previously, a “crucial step in the reasoning of the Court’s decisions
expanding arbitrability [to mandatory law claims] is that ‘the streamlined procedures of
arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction on substantive rights.’”97
95

As noted above, a typical statement of the law was “unless restricted by the agreement of submission,
arbitrators are the final judges of both law and fact, and an award will not be reviewed or set aside for
mistake in either.” See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
96

Similarly, several scholars argue that broader enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements warrants
tighter judicial review of arbitral awards, but these arguments typically emphasize the distinction between
business v. business disputes on the one hand and consumer/employee v. business disputes on the other. As
Nancy Welsh points out, several scholars have “begun to urge more rigorous judicial review in the
disparate party context,” that is, the context in which one party is a “more powerful repeat player,”
typically a business, and the other is a “one-time player,” typically a consumer or employee of the business.
See Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing
Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187, 207 (2012) (citing Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to
Permit Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007); Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial
Review and the Limits of Arbitral Authority: Lessons from the Law of Contract, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 99
(2007); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251
(2007-2008); Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929 (2010)); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third
Arbitration Triology: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration,
22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 323, 339 (2011) (“Because of the Court's consistent penchant for enforcing
arbitration agreements, increasing attention has been paid to the degree of scrutiny given by courts to
arbitration awards in the course of ruling on motions to vacate.”); Nancy A. Welsh, Introduction, 5 Y.B.
ON ARB. & MEDIATION v, vi (2013) (“[a]t this point in the evolution of mandatory predispute arbitration,
judicial review is the slender reed that remains to ensure that the procedure is sufficiently accountable to
merit access to the enforcement power of the state. Consistent with this new reality, Professor Jeffrey
Stempel urges that the Supreme Court's expansive enforcement of arbitration agreements must be matched
by an equally-expansive jurisprudence regarding the grounds for judicial review. He urges, in particular,
that if arbitral awards reflect clear errors of factual determination or application of law, they should be …
vacated.” (citing Jeffrey W. Stempel, Asymmetric Dynamism and Acceptable Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards, 5 PENN ST. Y.B ARB. & MEDIATION 1 (2013))).
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Ware, supra note 36, at 715-16 (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232); see also Christopher R. Drahozal
& Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1146-47 (2011) (“With the demise
of the non-arbitrability doctrine (or, rather, as part of that demise), the Supreme Court moved to what might
be called a ‘legal’ model of the arbitration process. Under this model, arbitration is an appropriate setting
for the resolution of statutory claims because ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial, forum.’ The Court presumes that outcomes in arbitration and litigation will not necessarily
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This point is essential to the Court’s conclusion that claims such as
antitrust, securities, and employment discrimination are arbitrable.
If an agreement to arbitrate one of these claims did entail a
“restriction on substantive rights,” the Court would not enforce the
agreement because the statutes conferring the rights are
indisputably mandatory, not default, rules. For example, in
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.,
the Court held that antitrust claims were arbitrable. The Court
explicitly rested its holding on the premise that the arbitrators
would apply federal antitrust statutes to the dispute and that a court
would grant a motion to vacate the arbitration award if the
arbitrators did not apply them.98
In short, the Supreme Court’s opinions in its 1985-1991 expansion of arbitrability to
mandatory law claims suggested in dicta that courts could review awards for errors of
law.
Perhaps the Court was trying to make its expansion of enforceable pre-dispute
arbitration agreements from default to mandatory law less controversial by calming fears
that claims in areas such as employment discrimination and investor protection would be
sent to “lawless” arbitration. However, the Supreme Court’s statement that “judicial
scrutiny of arbitration awards...is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute” clashed with the longstanding rule that “arbitrators are the
final judges of both law and fact, and an award will not be reviewed or set aside for
mistake in either.”99 And the Supreme Court’s representations of sufficient judicial
differ, and refuses to question whether the resolution of statutory claims by arbitrators inherently differs
from the resolution of such claims by judges.”).
98

Ware, supra note 36, at 715-16. In holding the antitrust claim arbitrable, Mitsubishi considered the
possibility that “the arbitrators could consider [it] to fall within the purview of th[e] choice-of-law
provision, with the result that it would be decided under Swiss law rather than the U.S. Sherman Act.”
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n. 19 (1985). The Court said
this was unlikely to occur because “counsel for Mitsubishi conceded that American law applied to the
antitrust claims.” Id. Thus the Court believed there was little risk the arbitrators would interpret the
arbitration clause, in combination with the Swiss choice-of-law clause, as contracting out of the Sherman
Act. See id. As guidance for future cases, however, the Court cautioned that “in the event the choice-offorum [arbitration] and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right
to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the
agreement as against public policy.” Id. Finally, “courts of the United States will have the opportunity at
the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws
has been addressed.” Id. at 638. See also LeRoy, supra note 17, at 176 (“the 1991 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. articulated a broad theory of forum substitution,
leading employers and workers to bypass court as they arbitrate their legal claims. Gilmer fortified its
forum substitution theory by stating that ‘although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is
limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute at
issue.’”).
99

See supra note 35 (citing cases from 1920’s to 1980’s); see also supra note 16 (citing cases pre-1920’s)
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review of awards’ rulings of law were mere dicta in cases about enforcement of
executory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.100 The Supreme Court’s representations of
meaningful judicial review were not made in the context of actually deciding whether to
confirm or vacate an award.
The confirm-or-vacate cases the Court did take from the 1980’s to 2008 continued
to be labor cases involving, not mandatory law claims, but default law claims about
contract interpretation. In that default-law context, the Court continued its longstanding
practice of enforcing awards without asking whether they are legally erroneous. The
Court in 1987 reaffirmed its rule that “as long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a
court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his
decision.”101 In a 2000 labor case, Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine
Workers,102 the Supreme Court reiterated its support for pre-dispute privatization through
arbitration and its recognition that (in the context of contract claims) arbitrators are
merely filling gaps in contracts, that is, doing what the parties could have done
themselves in an enforceable pre-dispute contract:
Eastern does not claim here that the arbitrator acted outside the
scope of his contractually delegated authority. Hence we must treat
the arbitrator's award as if it represented an agreement between
Eastern and the union as to the proper meaning of the contract's
words “just cause.” For present purposes, the award is not
distinguishable from the contractual agreement.103
Because the confirm-or-vacate cases the Supreme Court took from the 1980’s to
2008 did not involve mandatory law claims, the Court never gave itself an opportunity to
vacate an award on the ground that the arbitrator did not “comply with the requirements
of the statute” giving rise to the claim. In other words, the Court never gave itself an
opportunity to conform the law to its representation that “judicial scrutiny of arbitration
awards...is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the
statute” giving rise to a mandatory law claim.
However, several lower courts pushed case law toward the Supreme Court’s
representation of it, that is, toward vacating legally-erroneous awards arising out of
mandatory law claims. While many courts had held out the possibility that they could
100

Paul Kirgis describes the Court as “Paying lip service to the need for accurate determinations of
statutory rights.” Paul F. Kirgis, Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis, 17
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 503, 534 (2009).
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United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
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Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 (2000);
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Id. at 62; see also George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany and Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001) (“In
the main, an arbitrator acts as the parties’ agent and as their delegate may do anything the parties may do
directly.”).
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vacate awards in cases of “manifest disregard of the law” by the arbitrator,104 this
doctrine was very narrow105 so it was nearly impossible, until about 1997, to find a case
vacating an arbitration award in reliance on it.106 But then some courts began expanding
the “manifest disregard” doctrine to more closely conform to the Supreme Court’s
repeated statement that “judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards ... is sufficient to ensure
that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute” giving rise to the claim.107
Perhaps the leading case was Cole v. Burns International Security Services,108 a
1997 D.C. Circuit opinion written by Judge Harry Edwards, a former law professor and
labor arbitrator.
Cole held that agreements to arbitrate statutory employment
discrimination claims were enforceable “only if judicial review under the ‘manifest
disregard of the law’ standard is sufficiently rigorous to ensure that arbitrators have
properly interpreted and applied statutory law.”109 The opinion went on to assert that
“the courts are empowered to review an arbitrator’s award to ensure that its resolution of
public law issues is correct.”110 Cole, in essence, called for the “manifest disregard of
law” standard to become a de novo “error of law” standard, at least with respect to claims
under statutory or public law.
Along these lines, the following year the Second Circuit in Halligan v. Piper
Jaffray, Inc.,111 reversed a district court’s denial of a motion to vacate for manifest
disregard of employment discrimination law. Halligan said that “when a reviewing court
104

Every United States Court of Appeals and many state appellate courts adopted some version of the
“manifest disregard” doctrine. Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So.2d 27, 48-50 (Ala. 2004) (citing
cases). The Supreme Court apparently endorsed it in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 942 (1995) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953)); see also Ga. Code Ann. § 9-913(b)(5) (2006) (“The award shall be vacated * * * if the court finds that the rights of that party were
prejudiced by: *** The arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.”).
105

An oft-cited Second Circuit opinion said that an error of law should lead to vacatur for “manifest
disregard” only if the error is “obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average
person qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term ‘disregard’ implies that the arbitrator
appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to
it.” Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986).
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See MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 10, at § 40.7.1, 40:84 - 40:85; Cole v. Burns Int’l
Security Services, 105 F. 3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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Professor LeRoy “argues that courts embraced the manifest disregard standard in response to the rapid
upsurge in mandatory arbitrations in the 1990s that involved statutory issues. Bowing to the Gilmer Court's
strong pronouncement in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements, these courts ensured that arbitrators did
not intentionally ignore the laws they were supposed to apply.” LeRoy, supra note 17 at 171 (citing Porzig
v. Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, N.A., Inc., 497 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2007); Halligan v. Piper Jaffray,
Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 201-02; Mantes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461-62)).
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Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs.,105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This case is also discussed in § 4.7.
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Id. at 1487.
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See Halligan, 148 F.3d at 204.
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is inclined to hold that an arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law, the failure of
the arbitrators to explain the award can be taken into account.”112 The Halligan opinion
seemed to challenge the longstanding practice (in many sorts of cases) of arbitrators not
to write reasoned opinions justifying their decisions. That practice (which may be
fading) largely ensured that parties challenging arbitration awards have little to point to
and, consequently, little chance of persuading a court to vacate the award.113 If the law
had continued moving in the direction exemplified by Cole and Halligan, arbitrators
might have been required to write reasoned opinions, giving parties more opportunity to
identify manifest disregard of the law by arbitrators.
3. Disarray in 1991-2007 Law of Vacating Legally-Erroneous Awards
While tightening the “manifest disregard of law” doctrine along the lines
suggested by Cole and Halligan might have conformed the law to the Supreme Court’s
representation of “judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards...sufficient to ensure that
arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute” giving rise to a mandatory law
claim,114 such tightening did not occur. Instead, many courts continued to adhere to the
longstanding rule that they should confirm awards without reviewing them for errors of
law. This traditional approach was perhaps especially pervasive in state courts, some of
which did not adopt the “manifest disregard of law” doctrine at all.115 For instance, a
1992 California Supreme Court decision said:
As early as 1852, this court recognized that, ‘The arbitrators are
not bound to award on principles of dry law, but may decide on
principles of equity and good conscience, and make their award ex
aequo et bono [according to what is just and good].’ As a
consequence, arbitration awards are generally immune from
judicial review.116
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Id.
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Trivisonno v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 39 Fed. App’x 236, 241 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The Sixth Circuit
has continued to hold that arbitrators are not required to explain their decisions. That remains the law in
this circuit, however desirable it might be, despite the recognition that should arbitrators choose not to
explain their decisions it becomes all but impossible to determine whether they acted with manifest
disregard for the law.” (quotations omitted)).
114

See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987). Accord 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, n.10 (2009); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4
(1991).
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“While 27 jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform or Federal Arbitration Acts do not allow a court
to review arbitrators' interpretations of law, 18 jurisdictions that have adopted these statutes allow a court to
conduct a review for arbitrators' ‘manifest disregard of the law.’” Stephen Wills Murphy, Judicial Review
of Arbitration Awards Under State Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 887, 911 (2010).
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Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 904 (Cal. 1992) (citations omitted)
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In 2001, the Connecticut Supreme Court reaffirmed that “[u]nder an unrestricted
submission, the arbitrators’ decision is considered final and binding; thus the courts will
not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for
errors of law or fact.”117 A 2002 New York appellate court said “Unless the arbitration
agreement provides otherwise, an arbitrator is not bound by principles of substantive law
or by rules of evidence but may do justice as he sees it, applying his own sense of law
and equity to the facts as he finds them to be and his award will not be vacated unless it is
violative of a strong public policy, or is totally irrational, or exceeds a specifically
enumerated limitation on his power.”118
While all the federal circuit courts eventually adopted some version of the
“manifest disregard of law” doctrine,119 their difficult task was deciding which arbitral
errors of law it covered. Here is a sampling of their statements:







“a mere mistake of law by an arbitrator cannot serve as the basis for judicial
review.”120
“A federal court cannot vacate an arbitral award merely because it is convinced
that the arbitration panel made the wrong call on the law.”121
“Only a manifest disregard for the law, in contrast to a misinterpretation,
misstatement, or misapplication of the law, can constitute grounds to vacate an
arbitration decision.”122
“confirmation is required even in the face of erroneous… misinterpretations of
law... It is not enough that the [arbitral] Panel may have failed to understand or
apply the law... An arbitrator’s decision must be upheld unless it is completely
irrational, or it constitutes a manifest disregard for the law.”123
“we have defined ‘manifest disregard of the law’ so narrowly that … we have
confined it to cases in which arbitrators ‘direct the parties to violate the law.’”124
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Indus. Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 779 A.2d 737, 744 (Conn. 2001)
(citations omitted).
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Azrielant v. Azrielant, 752 N.Y.S.2d 19, 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (quotations omitted).

119

Every United States Court of Appeals and many state appellate courts adopted some version of the
“manifest disregard” doctrine. Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 48-50 (Ala. 2004) (citations
omitted).
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P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2005); see also T.Co. Metals, LLC v.
Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2010) (vacating an award requires more than
error or misunderstanding of the law).
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Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2004).
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omitted).
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The previous paragraphs show that, around the turn of the millennium, courts
immediately below the Supreme Court (state high courts and federal circuit courts of
appeal) could be found making almost diametrically opposed statements. They said
everything from the Connecticut Supreme Court’s statement that courts “will not review
the award for errors of law,” to the D.C. Circuit’s statement (in Cole) that judicial review
“is sufficiently rigorous to ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied
statutory law.” Many intermediate positions also had adherents among the courts.
Most of the manifest-disregard cases discussed above arose out of arbitration
agreements that did not ask courts to vacate legally erroneous awards—“unrestricted
submissions”—so the law governing unrestricted submissions was clearly ripe for
clarification.
Similarly, the law on vacating legally-erroneous awards arising out of restricted
submissions was also ripe for clarification because a circuit split had arisen on whether to
enforce agreements asking courts to vacate legally-erroneous awards.125 So by the first
few years of the 2000’s courts were split on legally-erroneous awards arising out of both
unrestricted and restricted submissions. The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Hall
Street Associates v. Mattel,126 strongly impacted both splits, but did not fully resolve
either of them.
D. 2008-Present: Continued Doubt about Vacating Legally-Erroneous Awards
1. Restricted Submissions in and after Hall Street
Hall Street had odd facts for a contemporary arbitration case. While most
contemporary arbitration agreements are unrestricted submissions formed pre-dispute,127
Hall Street involved a restricted submission formed post-dispute—indeed post-trial.128
The case involved a manufacturing site Mattel leased from Hall Street under lease terms
requiring Mattel to indemnify Hall Street “for any costs resulting from the failure of
[Mattel] or its predecessor lessees to follow environmental laws while using the
premises.”129 After Mattel gave notice of intent to end the lease, Hall Street sued in
federal district court “contesting Mattel's right to vacate on the date Mattel gave, and
claiming that the lease obliged Mattel to indemnify Hall Street for costs of cleaning up”
125

WARE, supra note 8, at § 2.45(c).
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Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
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See supra note 7.
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Professor LeRoy argues that the historical and normative case for vacating legally-erroneous awards
strengthens in cases (like Hall Street) in which arbitration is used to resolve a dispute that has already been
in court. “[T]he historical distinction between civil code and common law arbitrations ... shows that when a
dispute is already in court, and arbitration is used as an auxiliary process, courts may review rulings for
legal errors. Otherwise, not only is the legitimacy of arbitration open to question, but so is the court's ability
to provide justice. No court can be above the law, and therefore, judges must ensure that no arbitrator
intentionally puts an award above the law.” LeRoy, supra note 17, at 151.
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Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 579.
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trichloroethylene in the property’s water.130 Following a bench trial in which Mattel won
on the termination issue, the parties proposed to arbitrate Hall Street's claim for
indemnification.131 “The District Court was amenable, and the parties drafted an
arbitration agreement, which the court approved and entered as an order.”132 One
paragraph of the agreement provided that
[t]he United States District Court for the District of Oregon may
enter judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award or
by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The Court shall
vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's
findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii)
where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous.133
The arbitrator ruled for Mattel but the district court vacated the award for legal error. 134
The district court’s decision to enforce the parties’ restricted submission (asking the court
to vacate any award “where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous” 135 )
followed a Ninth Circuit decision, LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.,136 which
similarly enforced a restricted submission providing that “The Court shall vacate, modify
or correct any award ... where the arbitrators’ conclusions of law are erroneous.”137
In Hall Street, on remand from the district court to arbitration, the arbitrator ruled
for Hall Street, and the district court largely upheld the award.138 However, the Ninth
Circuit reversed because it had since overruled LaPine and decided, en banc, not to
enforce agreements asking the court to vacate legally-erroneous awards.139 Similarly, in
Hall Street, the Supreme Court decided against enforcing such agreements, which the
130

Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 580.
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While some might use the phrase “restricted submission” to include agreements requiring arbitrators to
apply the law correctly but not agreements asking courts to vacate legally-erroneous awards, I think these
are substantively the same and use “restricted submission” to encompass them both.
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130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997).
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LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp, 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997) (the full passage reads “The
Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) based upon any of the grounds referred to in the
Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitrators' findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence,
or (iii) where the arbitrators' conclusions of law are erroneous.”).
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Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. 576 (see syllabus).
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential–Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (2003).
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Court characterized as attempts to expand the grounds for vacatur beyond those listed in
the FAA.140 The Hall Street Court stated that the FAA’s four grounds for vacatur are
“exclusive” so courts should not enforce contractually-created grounds for vacatur.141
The Court viewed the FAA’s provisions on confirmation and vacatur of arbitration
awards
as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the
limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of
resolving disputes straightaway. Any other reading opens the door
to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render
informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and
time-consuming judicial review process and bring arbitration
theory to grief in post-arbitration process.142
I disagree with Hall Street on several levels. First, and most fundamentally, I
disagree with Hall Street about arbitration’s “essential virtue.” Unlike Hall Street, I do
not see speed or finality (“resolving disputes straightaway”143) as arbitration’s essential
virtue because I believe both speed and finality are subsumed by party autonomy, which
is my vote for “arbitration’s essential virtue.” As I wrote in a 2006 book:
I do not see secrecy, arbitrator expertise, adjudication efficiency or
finality as necessary values of arbitration. I see autonomy as the
value that transcends these other values. Because arbitration law
gives the parties autonomy, they can choose to have their
arbitration be secret or not. Because arbitration law gives the
parties autonomy, they can choose to have their arbitrator be an
expert or not. Because arbitration law gives the parties autonomy,
they can choose to have their arbitration use quick and efficient
procedures or not. Because arbitration law gives the parties
autonomy, they can choose to make their arbitration final or – by
having an appellate arbitration panel or expanding the grounds for
vacatur – not.
It is certainly true that most parties to arbitration agreements
choose to use their autonomy to advance the values of secrecy,
arbitrator expertise, adjudication efficiency and finality. But, in my
140

“[T]o rest this case on the general policy of treating arbitration agreements as enforceable as such would
be to beg the question, which is whether the FAA has textual features at odds with enforcing a contract to
expand judicial review following the arbitration.” Hall St. Assoc., 552 U.S. at 586; “[The Ninth Circuit]
found the expanded-review provision unenforceable under Kyocera.” Id. at 591.
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Id. at 584.
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Id. at 588 (quotation omitted).
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Id.
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view, that does not show that these are core values of arbitration; it
shows that these are core values of most of the parties who agree to
arbitrate. If the values of those people changed, arbitration would
change accordingly; but it would do so because of its core value,
autonomy, not because it was abandoning other core values. 144
Accordingly, I have proposed language to amend the FAA to enforce restricted
submissions by vacating legally-erroneous awards arising out of agreements calling for
such vacatur.145
My second disagreement with Hall Street is one of statutory interpretation.146
Specifically, FAA § 10(a)(4), which permits courts to vacate an arbitration award where
“the arbitrators exceeded their powers,”147 can fairly be interpreted to authorize vacatur
of legally-erroneous awards arising out of restricted submissions, that is, agreements
requiring arbitrators to apply the law correctly.148 Whether the agreement is written as a
144

WARE, in BRUNET, ET AL., supra note 47, at 107-08, 349 (proposing pre-Hall Street circuit split be
resolved with statute instructing courts to vacate an arbitration award when doing so “would enforce the
agreement submitting the controversy to arbitration.”); see also Alan Scott Rau, Fear of Freedom, 17 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 469, 479 (2006) (criticizing Hall Street: “Since arbitration has no virtues other than what
the parties themselves happen to find in it, ‘public policy’ cannot lie in imposing a particular image of
arbitration on them against their will.”); id. at 490 (“It does seem extraordinarily officious--indeed,
perverse--to insist on imposing the putative ‘benefits’ of finality and economy on parties who, in their
contract, have done everything they possibly could to wriggle out from under them.”); see also Lawrence
A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court Flaunts
and Flunks Contracts, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 143 (2012) (“The clearest declaration of the death
of contract in federal arbitration jurisprudence is Hall Street.”).
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hostile courts, not a sword with which to cut down parties' ‘valid, irrevocable and enforceable’ agreements
to arbitrate their disputes subject to judicial review for errors of law.”).
147

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).

148

Several leading arbitration scholars have been making this point for decades. See Alan Scott Rau,
Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 225, 239 (1997) (“A contract that withdraws
errors of law from the authority conferred on the arbitrator - that, in other words, places issues of law
‘beyond the scope of the submission’ to binding arbitration- should, then, allow an aggrieved party on
‘review’ to invoke § 10(a)(4).”); see also Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration With a Contract
Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 73 (1999) (“[Rau’s] approach makes eminent sense and is
supported by the abundantly clear text of section 10(a)(4) that expressly permits parties to curtail arbitral
power. If the parties require the arbitrators to apply substantive law of a particular state, section 10(a)(4)
requires a court to respect such a bargain by providing meaningful review. Such review should not be
viewed as an expansion of the FAA. Rather, it merely represents review of the parties' arbitration bargain
itself.”); Drahozal, supra note 12, at 916 (in favor of “…allowing parties to contract for expanded review
by restricting the authority of the arbitrators…”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration,
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restriction on the arbitrator (depriving the arbitrator of the power to issue an award that
includes error of law) or an authorization for courts to vacate legally-erroneous awards
should not matter as they are substantively the same. Unfortunately, since Hall Street,
most courts have refused to enforce both types of agreements requiring arbitrators to
apply the law correctly.149 I believe courts should enforce both agreements requiring
arbitrators to apply the law correctly and agreements asking courts to vacate legallyerroneous awards for reasons of both autonomy and efficiency.150
My third disagreement with Hall Street is with its dicta that, as Tom Carbonneau
says, “makes understanding difficult.”151 Hall Street said:
63 IND. L.J. 425, 486 n.339 (1988) (“While it is presumably not within the power of parties to contract to
expand the statutorily-conferred scope of review . . . the parties may accomplish the same goal indirectly”
by relying on the “excess of authority” statutory ground); MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH supra note 10
at §36.6 (“With respect to matters of law, it is frequently said that, if arbitrators are required by the terms of
a given submission to decide ‘according to law,’ an award may be vacated as for mistake of law if the
arbitrators decide contrary to law. . . . Their award may fall even though they have misjudged the law, for
they depart, it is said, from their authority under the submission.”); but see Stephen L. Hayford, A New
Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the
Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 456 (1998) (“Attempts to seek vacatur based
on a claim that the arbitrator committed an error of law are not proper under the ‘exceeded powers' clause
of section 10(a)(4).”).
149

See Rent-a-Ctr, Inc. v. Barker, 633 F. Supp. 2d 245, 256-57 (W.D. La. 2009) (citing Hall Street in
refusing to enforce agreement giving each party the right to “bring a separate action in any court of
competent jurisdiction to set aside the award, where the standard of review will be the same as that applied
by an appellate court reviewing a decision of a trial court sitting without a jury.”); see also Francis v.
Landstar Sys. Holdings, Inc., No. 3:09–cv–238–J–32JRK, 2009 WL 4350250, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25,
2009) (citing Hall Street in refusing to enforce agreement that the “Arbitrator’s authority is strictly limited
to resolving the Dispute on the basis of such applicable state or federal law”); Wood v. Penntex Res. LP,
Civil Action No. H-06-2198, 2008 WL 2609319, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2008) (citing Hall Street in
refusing to enforce agreement providing that “this Agreement confers no power or authority upon the
arbitrators to render any decision that is based on clearly erroneously findings of fact, that manifestly
disregards the law, or exceeds of the powers of the arbitrator, and no such decision will be eligible for
confirmation.”); In re Raymond Prof’l Group, Inc., 397 B.R. 414, 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008) (“Until Hall
Street was decided, the Seventh Circuit panel opinion in Edstrom Indus. could have been read to expand the
standard of review for vacating an arbitration award. However, after Hall Street, the Edstrom Indus.
opinion must be read more narrowly.”); Brookfield Country Club, Inc. v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 696
S.E.2d 663 (Ga. 2010); HL 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 15 A.3d 725 (Me. 2011); Pugh’s Lawn Landscape
Co. v. Jaycon Dev. Corp., 320 S.W.3d 252 (Tenn. 2010).
150

See Rau, supra note 144, at 507-08 (“Even partial recourse to the arbitration process [under an
agreement calling for judicial review of arbitrators’ legal rulings] is calculated to produce economies in
judicial resources” compared to not agreeing to arbitrate at all).
151

Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates,
14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 593, 608 (2013).
In dicta, the Court tries to temper the effect of its exclusivity holding by
contending that the supervision of arbitral awards is available outside the
framework of the FAA. In other words, although the statutory grounds are
“exclusive” (otherwise stated, not modifiable by contract), the parties could
obtain “more searching review” of awards (i.e., review of the merits) under
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In holding that [FAA] §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for
the review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that
they exclude more searching review based on authority outside the
statute as well. The FAA is not the only way into court for parties
wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate
enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example,
where judicial review of different scope is arguable. But here we
speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial review under §§
9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possible avenues for
judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.152
If parties want “more searching [judicial] review” of arbitration awards “under
state statutory or common law,” what do they have to do to get it? Put a clause to that
effect in their arbitration agreement? Or is judicial review under state, rather than
federal, law something that can only be chosen post-award by the party who asks a court
to review an award—and perhaps engages in forum-shopping in choosing which court to
ask?153
Hall Street’s difficult-to-understand dicta may suggest that the FAA does not
preempt state law adding at least some grounds for vacatur beyond those in the FAA. In
contrast, some federal courts before Hall Street held that the FAA preempts state grounds
for vacatur not found in federal law.154 On the other hand, a few post-Hall Street state
other frameworks for judicial supervision. The assertion is mesmerizing. By way
of illustration, the Court explains that parties “may contemplate enforcement
under state statutory or common law. . . where judicial review of different scope
is arguable.” It is difficult to divine what Justice Souter means by “arguable” in
this statement; the word is another fastidious understatement that makes
understanding difficult. More importantly, the contention does not seem to
account for the impact of the federal preemption doctrine.
Id. at 608-09.
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Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008).

153

An action to vacate an arbitration award may be brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction or,
if there is diversity or federal question jurisdiction, in federal court. See Smith v. Rush Retail Centers, Inc.,
360 F.3d 504, 505 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia
Circuits have held that § 10 of the FAA does not confer federal jurisdiction and that there must be an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction before a district court may entertain a petition to vacate an
arbitration award.”).
154

See Alston v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 04-01798(HHK), 2006 WL 20516, at *1 n.3 (D.D.C.
2006) (“The Alstons attempt to rely on Virginia law as a basis for vacatur as well [as the FAA]. The court,
however, need not analyze the Alstons’ motion under Virginia law because, to the extent that the FAA and
Virginia law conflict, state law is preempted”); see also In re Arbitration between Lemoine Skinner III v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., No. C 03–2625 VRW, 2003 WL 23174478, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 29, 2003) (“the [FAA] sets out the exclusive grounds upon which an arbitration award may be
vacated. . . . Any state law that allows for additional grounds for dismissal of an arbitration award would be
preempted by the FAA.”); Jacada (Europe) Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 255 F.Supp. 2d 744, 750-51
(W.D. Mich. 2003); M & L Power Servs., Inc. v. Am. Networks Int’l, 44 F. Supp. 2d 134, 141-42 (D.R.I.
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supreme court decisions have relied on state law to reach the opposite result from Hall
Street, that is, to enforce agreements requiring arbitrators to apply the law correctly.155
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether these decisions will
survive challenges based on FAA preemption of state law. So the enforceability of
restricted submissions (agreements requiring arbitrators to apply the law correctly or
agreements asking courts to vacate legally-erroneous awards) remains uncertain in some
state courts, even after Hall Street.156

1999) (“the FAA only preempts state law to the extent that said state law provides lesser protection for
arbitration agreements and awards than does federal law. . . . In this case, the ‘complete irrationality’
ground for vacating an arbitration award violates Congress’ policy as set forth in the FAA. As such, it is
preempted and may not be applied to any case to which the FAA applies”); Collins v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Mich., 916 F.Supp. 638, 640-42 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (as between Michigan’s standard and federal
“manifest disregard of law” standard, “the federal standard of review must prevail”), vacated on other
grounds, 103 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1996) (no federal jurisdiction); MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra
note 10, at § 40.1 (“the FAA preempts any state grounds for vacation unless the parties have clearly agreed
to be bound by them.”).
On the other hand, the Washington Supreme Court apparently does not believe the FAA preempts state
grounds for vacatur not in the FAA. In the 2010 case of Broom v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 236 P.3d 182
(Wash. 2010), it affirmed a lower court order vacating an award on the ground that the award contained
facial legal error. “[T]he arbitration panel ruled that all of the Brooms’ claims except for the CPA claim
were barred by state and federal statutes of limitations.” Id. at 183-84. “The Brooms filed a complaint in
superior court and moved to vacate the arbitration award. They argued that the award contained facial legal
error because state statutes of limitations do not apply to arbitration. The trial court agreed and vacated the
award.” Id. at 184. The dissent argued that this is not a ground for vacatur under the FAA and that the FAA
preempts Washington law to the extent it has this ground. Id. at 192 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). The
majority did not respond to this argument or otherwise mention the FAA.
155

See Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Honea, 55 So.3d 1161, 1169 (Ala.2010) (“Under the Alabama
common law, courts must rigorously enforce contracts, including arbitration agreements, according to their
terms in order to give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties. Applying that principle
in this case requires us to give effect to the provision in the arbitration agreement authorizing a court
having jurisdiction to conduct a de novo review of the award entered as a result of arbitration proceedings
conducted pursuant to that same agreement.”); see also Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirectTV, Inc., 190 P.3d
586, 589 (Cal. 2008) (discussing Hall Street and concluding that FAA does not preempt state law enforcing
arbitration agreement providing that “The arbitrators shall not have the power to commit errors of law or
legal reasoning, and the award may be vacated or corrected on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction
for any such error.”); Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 88 (Tex.2011) (enforcing an arbitration
agreement that said “[t]he arbitrator does not have authority (i) to render a decision which contains a
reversible error of state or federal law, or (ii) to apply a cause of action or remedy not expressly provided
for under existing state or federal law.”).
In contrast, several states’ courts hold that their state law does not enforce contractually-created
grounds for vacatur. See Brookfield Country Club, Inc. v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 696 S.E.2d 663, 667
(Ga. 2010); see also HL 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 15 A.3d 725 (Me. 2011); Brucker v. McKinlay
Transp., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 536, 540 (Mich. 1997); John T. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 665
N.W.2d 698, 704 (N.D. 2003); Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Co., Inc. v. Jaycon Dev. Corp., 320 S.W.3d 252,
260 (Tenn. 2010).
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Carbonneau, supra note 151, at 602-03 (“To the extent it fails to conform to the preemption standard,
the observation in dicta should be seen as an ill-considered remark that confuses even further an already
convoluted discussion.”).
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2. Unrestricted Submissions After Hall Street, Stolt and Sutter
a. Hall Street
As noted above, Hall Street viewed the FAA’s provisions on confirmation and
vacatur of arbitration awards
as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the
limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of
resolving disputes straightaway. Any other reading opens the door
to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render
informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and
time-consuming judicial review process and bring arbitration
theory to grief in post-arbitration process.157
This push to limit judicial review of arbitration awards, along with Hall Street’s
statement that the FAA’s four grounds for vacatur are “exclusive,” led some courts to
conclude that Hall Street prohibits not only contractually-created grounds for vacatur, but
also judicially-created grounds for vacatur, including “manifest disregard of law.”158 By
contrast, other courts continued after Hall Street to recognize “manifest disregard of law”
as a ground to vacate awards.159 Some of these courts reason that judicially-created
grounds, such as “manifest disregard of law,” are better characterized as statutory
grounds because they are shorthand to define what constitutes arbitrators’ “exceed[ing]
157

Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396, 1405 (2008) (quotation omitted).

158

Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Hall Street
and stating that the claim that an arbitrator disregarded the law is not enumerated in § 10 and is therefore
not cognizable); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1322-4 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Although
our prior precedents have recognized these three non-statutory grounds for vacatur [arbitrary and
capricious, public policy, and manifest disregard]…We hold that our judicially-created bases for vacatur
are no longer valid in light of Hall Street.”); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th
Cir. 2009); Robert Lewis Rosen Assocs., Ltd. v. Webb, 566 F. Supp. 2d 228, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (due to
Hall Street, “[M]anifest disregard of the law standard is no longer good law.”); Carey Rodriguez Greenberg
& Paul, LLP v. Arminak, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Hall Street and stating that
“An allegation that the Award violates public policy is not one of the four exclusive statutory grounds upon
which the Award may be vacated.”); Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 13 So. 3d 375, 382 (Ala. 2009) (“[W]e
hereby overrule our earlier statement …that manifest disregard of the law is a ground for vacating … an
arbitrator’s award.”); Ancor Holdings, LLC v. Peterson, Goldman & Villani, Inc., 294 S.W.3d 818, 829
(Tex. App. 2009) (“[M]anifest disregard of the law and gross mistake are not grounds for vacating an
arbitration award under the FAA.”); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Federalization of Consumer
Arbitration; Possible Solutions 2013, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 271, 311 (2013) (“Following Hall Street, parties
may no longer be able to challenge an arbitration award on the extra-statutory ground that the arbitrator
manifestly disregarded the law.”).
159

Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacating an award on
manifest disregard grounds post-Hall Street); Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds, 548 F. 3d 85, 93-95 (2d
Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010); Sharp v. Downey, 13 A. 3d 1, 21 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2010) (vacating award due to manifest disregard of law, which continues to be a ground for vacatur
under Maryland Arbitration Act).
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their powers” under FAA § 10(a)(4).160 This split of authority on manifest disregard
shows that Hall Street left much uncertainty on a very fundamental question of
arbitration law, whether arbitration awards must apply the law correctly to avoid vacatur.
Hall Street left much uncertainty about whether courts would:
1) conform the law to the Supreme Court’s 1985-1991 representation of “judicial
scrutiny of arbitration awards...sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with
the requirements of the statute” giving rise to a mandatory law claim,161 by
vacating legally-erroneous awards denying rights under such law, or
2) disprove the Court’s 1985-1991 representation by abolishing the manifest
disregard ground for vacatur and solidifying the longstanding rule that courts
should confirm awards without determining whether they are legally-correct, or
3) find an intermediate position on vacating legally-erroneous awards.
The Supreme Court had a chance to reduce this uncertainty only two years after
Hall Street in the 2010 case of Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.162
Unfortunately, Stolt left this uncertainty in place and aggravated it with new uncertainty.
b. Stolt
In Stolt, AnimalFeeds brought an antitrust class action in federal court against a
group of ocean carriers (which the Court’s majority calls “shipping companies”). 163 The
Second Circuit ordered AnimalFeeds to arbitrate its claim because its contract with the
defendants contained the following clause:
160

Comedy Club, 553 F. 3d at 1290; Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S. 2d 342, 349 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.) (“[T]his court will view ‘manifest disregard of law’ as judicial interpretation of the section 10
requirement, rather than a separate standard of review.”); id. at 351 (stating that the public policy ground
for vacatur is an interpretation of § 10(a)(4)); see MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 10, at §
40.5.1.3; see also Sands v. Menard, Inc., 787 N.W.2d 384, 397 (Wis. 2010) (“[A] court must overturn an
arbitrator’s award when the panel exceeds its powers … An arbitration panel exceeds its powers when it
engages in perverse misconstruction or positive misconduct, when the panel manifestly disregards the law,
or where the award itself is illegal or violates strong public policy.”); Broom v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc.,
236 P. 3d 182, 184 (Wash. 2010) (“[I]n Boyd v. Davis . . . we approved of facial legal error as an accepted
basis for vacating an arbitral award. In Boyd, we suggested that such error indicates that the arbitrators
exceeded their powers.”).
161

See Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S. 576; see also Ronald G. Arnovsky, The Supreme Court and the Future
of Arbitration Towards a Preemptive Federal Arbitration Procedural Paradigm?, 42 SW. L. REV. 131, 16162 (2012) (Hall Street and other “[P]ost-Gilmer decisions have called into question the continuing validity
of the Court’s underlying assumptions for its general conclusion that arbitration can be a reasonable
substitute for a judicial forum for the vindication of statutory rights. First, notwithstanding the role of a
reviewing court contemplated in Gilmer and Cole, after Hall Street a court may lack the authority under the
FAA to vacate a statutory claim arbitration award for failing to comply with the requirements of the statute
at issue.”).
162

See Stolt-Nielsen SA, 130 S.Ct. 1758.

163

See id.
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Arbitration. Any dispute arising from the making, performance or
termination of this Charter Party shall be settled in New York,
Owner and Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who shall be a
merchant, broker or individual experienced in the shipping
business; the two thus chosen, if they cannot agree, shall nominate
a third arbitrator who shall be an Admiralty lawyer. Such
arbitration shall be conducted in conformity with the provisions
and procedure of the United States Arbitration Act [ i.e., the FAA],
and a judgment of the Court shall be entered upon any award made
by said arbitrator.164
AnimalFeeds then served on the defendants a demand for class arbitration.165
While classwide arbitration was rare before 2000, it had become much more
common in the few years leading up to Stolt.166 This increase in class arbitration was
likely caused by, among other things, the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.167 The Bazzle case involved an arbitration agreement that
neither permitted nor prohibited class arbitration, but rather was silent on that question.
A plurality of the Court in Bazzle decided that it was for the arbitrator, rather than a court,
to interpret this silence,168 and many arbitrators after Bazzle interpreted “silent” contracts
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See id. at 1765.

165

See id.
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See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets Class Action, Will the Class Action
Survive? 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 38 n. 135 (2000); see also S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration
“Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 206-07 (2012).
167

Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). Bazzle involved Green Tree’s form consumer
loan contract, which contained an arbitration clause. Id. at 447. Plaintiffs sued Green Tree in South
Carolina state court and asked the court to certify a class action. Id. at 449. Green Tree sought to stay the
court proceedings and compel arbitration. Id. The trial court both (1) certified a class action and (2) entered
an order compelling arbitration. Id. Green Tree then selected an arbitrator with the plaintiffs’ consent and
the arbitrator, administering the proceeding as a class arbitration, awarded the class $10,935,000 in
statutory damages, along with attorney’s fees. Id. The trial court confirmed the award, and Green Tree
appealed claiming, among other things, that class arbitration was legally impermissible. Id. On appeal, the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the contracts were silent with respect to class arbitration, that they
consequently authorized class arbitration, and that arbitration had properly taken that form. Id. at 450. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether that holding is consistent with the FAA. Id.
While three dissenting justices thought the arbitration clause prohibited class arbitration, id. at 458-59,
the Court agreed with the South Carolina Supreme Court that the clause was silent on whether class
arbitration was permitted. Id. at 450-51. Rather than affirming the South Carolina Supreme Court,
however, the Court held that the arbitrator, rather than a court, should decide whether this silent contract
should be interpreted to permit or prohibit class arbitration. Id. at 451-52. Therefore, the Court remanded
for further proceedings. Id. at 454.
168

See supra note 167 (summarizing Bazzle).
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to permit class arbitration.169 Some of the major arbitration organizations developed
special rules for handling the growing number of demands for class arbitration.170
Just as the Bazzle contract was silent on whether class arbitration was permitted,
so too was the Stolt contract silent on whether class arbitration was permitted.
Accordingly, the parties in Stolt (following Bazzle’s instructions) prepared for arbitrators
to decide whether their arbitration clause permitted class arbitration. “The parties
selected a panel of arbitrators and stipulated that the arbitration clause was ‘silent’ with
respect to class arbitration.”171 The arbitrators issued a clause-construction award
concluding that the arbitration clause allowed for class arbitration, despite the defendants’
argument that the arbitration clause is “part of standard contract forms developed by
charterers and widely used by them and their brokers for 30 years” without ever being
“the basis of a class action.”172 While this argument did not persuade the arbitrators, it
did persuade the district court, which vacated the arbitrators’ clause-construction award
permitting class arbitration. The district court concluded that “the arbitrators manifestly
disregarded a well defined rule of governing maritime law that precluded class arbitration
under the clauses here in issue.”173 The Second Circuit reversed. Although the Second
Circuit concluded that the manifest disregard doctrine survived Hall Street,174 the Second
Circuit held that the “errors” the district court “identified” in the clause-construction
award did not “rise to the level of manifest disregard of the law.”175
While the manifest disregard doctrine was central in the courts below, it was not
central to the Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt, which said:
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P. Christine Deruelle & Robert Clayton Roesch, Gaming the Rigged Class Arbitration Game: How We
Got Here and Where We Go Now - Part I, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, August 2007, at 9
(“As of June 15, 2007, AAA arbitrators have rendered 51 Clause Construction Awards concerning
otherwise silent arbitration agreements, and in all but two of those decisions, the arbitrators have allowed
class wide proceedings.”), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/August/09.pdf.
170

AAA POLICY ON CLASS ARBITRATION, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (2005), available at
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_003840); JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES (2009),
available
at
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMSRules/JAMS_Class_Action_Procedures-2009.pdf; Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction and the
Supreme Court's Arbitration Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISPUTE RESOL., 1, 17-18 (2014) (“In response to
Bazzle, the American Arbitration Association adopted rules for administering class arbitrations, and
proceeded to administer over 350 class arbitrations under standards based in part on Bazzle. But in StoltNielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Court criticized such reliance on Bazzle, and in
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter the Court made clear that who decides whether an arbitration clause
authorizes class arbitration remains an open question. Bazzle has been left with essentially no remaining
effect.”).
171

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1766 (2010).
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Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Intern. Corp., 435 F.Supp.2d 382, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

173

Id. at 386.
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Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Intern. Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008).

175

Id. at 96.

100

We do not decide whether “‘manifest disregard’” survives our
decision in Hall Street [ ], as an independent ground for review or
as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth
at 9 U.S.C. § 10. AnimalFeeds characterizes that standard as
requiring a showing that the arbitrators “knew of the relevant
[legal] principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the
outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the
governing law by refusing to apply it.” Assuming, arguendo, that
such a standard applies, we find it satisfied for the reasons that
follow.176
Rather than cure long-festering uncertainty over the manifest disregard doctrine
for vacating legally-erroneous arbitration awards, Stolt added new uncertainty by
vacating the award on different reasoning. The Court said
Petitioners contend that the decision of the arbitration panel must
be vacated, but in order to obtain that relief, they must clear a high
hurdle. It is not enough for petitioners to show that the panel
committed an error—or even a serious error. See Eastern
Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62, 121
S.Ct. 462, 148 L.Ed.2d 354 (2000); Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987). “It is only
when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of
the agreement and effectively ‘dispense[s] his own brand of
industrial justice’ that his decision may be unenforceable.” Major
League Baseball Players Assn. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509,
1015, 121 S.Ct. 1724, 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001) (per curiam)
(quoting Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960)). In that situation,
an arbitration decision may be vacated under § 10(a)(4) of the
FAA on the ground that the arbitrator ‘exceeded [his] powers,’ for
the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a contract, not to
make public policy. In this case, we must conclude that what the
arbitration panel did was simply to impose its own view of sound
policy regarding class arbitration.177
Here the Supreme Court used its labor arbitration precedents to interpret the FAA.
This is problematic. First, the labor arbitration cases (Eastern Associated, Misco, and
Garvey) were not governed by the FAA, but rather by the federal common law of labor
arbitration under (the very skeletal) Labor Management Relations Act.178 While FAA
176

Id. (citations omitted).
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Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767-68 (2010).

178

Id.
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section 10 specifies grounds for vacatur, the LMRA “is much less specific. It simply
provides federal jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements, including
arbitration clauses in these contracts. Addressing this statutory void, the U.S. Supreme
Court has [in labor cases] provided standards for enforcing arbitration agreements and
arbitrator awards.”179 This case law for enforcing or vacating labor awards, developed the
dichotomy—embodied in the above quote from Garvey—that “the task of an arbitrator is
to interpret and enforce a contract, not to make public policy.”
This dichotomy may fit the breach-of-contract cases that have always been the
bulk of labor arbitration cases under the LMRA and were perhaps the bulk of arbitration
cases under the FAA before the 1980’s. However, as Section II.C of this Article
explained, since the 1980’s many arbitration cases under the FAA have involved—in
addition to or instead of contract claims—a wide variety of claims in areas such as
antitrust, securities, and employment discrimination. These cases require the arbitrator to
make legal rulings not described by either half of the Garvey dichotomy between
interpreting a contract and making public policy. The antitrust, securities, and
employment discrimination cases going to arbitration require arbitrators to apply
antitrust, securities, and employment discrimination law. That is neither interpreting a
contract nor making public policy. It is applying statutes and the case law interpreting
those statutes.
For example, consider the merits of Stolt, an antitrust case. Suppose a court had
been asked to review, not the arbitrators’ clause-construction award deciding whether
arbitration would proceed on a class basis, but rather a final award on the merits
containing the arbitrators’ decision that the defendants did or did not violate the antitrust
laws. Would it help a court reviewing that award to know that “the task of an arbitrator
is to interpret and enforce a contract, not to make public policy”? No. What that court
needs from the Supreme Court is guidance on how, if at all, to review the arbitrators’
applications of antitrust law. Similarly, countless courts since the 1980’s have needed
from the Supreme Court guidance on whether legally-erroneous awards (in antitrust,
securities, employment discrimination, and other areas of law) should be vacated.
So one might say that, in Stolt, the Supreme Court picked a case ill-suited to
curing long-festering uncertainty over judicial review of legally-erroneous arbitration
awards. To cure this uncertainty, the Court could have taken a case in which the
arbitrators erroneously ruled for defendants on the merits of an antitrust claim. The
Supreme Court may instead have granted certiorari in Stolt to reverse the spread of class
arbitration furthered by Bazzle.180 A cynical reading of Stolt is that the five conservative
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justices who comprised the Stolt majority do not like class actions (in arbitration or
litigation) and Stolt was just one of many cases in which those justices are restricting
class actions.181
Whatever one’s view of class actions though, in the realm of arbitration law Stolt
aggravated uncertainty over which legally-erroneous awards should be vacated under the
to resolve specialized disputes. But the relative benefits of class-action
arbitration are much less assured, giving reason to doubt the parties' mutual
consent to resolve disputes through class-wide arbitration.
Consider just some of the fundamental changes brought about by the shift
from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration. An arbitrator chosen
according to an agreed-upon procedure, no longer resolves a single dispute
between the parties to a single agreement, but instead resolves many disputes
between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of parties.. Under the Class Rules,
“the presumption of privacy and confidentiality” that applies in many bilateral
arbitrations “shall not apply in class arbitrations,” thus potentially frustrating the
parties' assumptions when they agreed to arbitrate. The arbitrator's award no
longer purports to bind just the parties to a single arbitration agreement, but
adjudicates the rights of absent parties as well. And the commercial stakes of
class-action arbitration are comparable to those of class-action litigation, even
though the scope of judicial review is much more limited. We think that the
differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for
arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that
the parties' mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes
consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.
Id. (citations omitted).
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manifest disregard doctrine by adding new uncertainty over which legally-erroneous
awards should be vacated as exceeding the arbitrators’ powers.182 Thus Stolt
compounded the uncertainty left by Hall Street over the fundamental question of whether
arbitration awards must apply the law correctly to avoid vacatur.
c. Sutter
While Stolt might have been read broadly to result in courts vacating many
legally-erroneous awards under FAA § 10(a)(4), this did not occur. In its 2013 decision in
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,183 a unanimous Court read Stolt so narrowly that a
distinguished arbitration scholar opines that “[a]fter Sutter, Stolt-Nielsen has largely been
limited to its facts.”184
In Sutter, a doctor brought a class action in a New Jersey court, despite a predispute arbitration clause in his contract with the defendant, Oxford.185 The trial court
granted Oxford’s motion to compel arbitration.186 “The parties agreed that the arbitrator
should decide whether their contract authorized class arbitration, and he determined that
it did.”187 “Oxford filed a motion in federal court to vacate the arbitrator's decision on the
ground that he had ‘exceeded [his] powers’ under FAA § 10(a)(4).”188 The district court
denied the motion to vacate, and both the Third Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed.189
Sutter cited Hall Street for the proposition “[t]hat limited judicial review . . .
‘maintains arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.’”190 Sutter
distinguished Stolt on the ground that the parties in Stolt “had entered into an unusual
stipulation that they had never reached an agreement on class arbitration” so the
arbitrators’ “decision was not—indeed, could not have been—‘based on a determination
182
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regarding the parties' intent.’”191 In short, the Stolt arbitrators (according to Sutter) “did
not construe the parties' contract, and did not identify any agreement authorizing class
proceedings.”192 In contrast, in Sutter
the arbitrator did construe the contract (focusing, per usual, on its
language), and did find an agreement to permit class arbitration. So
to overturn his decision, we would have to rely on a finding that he
misapprehended the parties' intent. But § 10(a)(4) bars that course:
It permits courts to vacate an arbitral decision only when the
arbitrator strayed from his delegated task of interpreting a contract,
not when he performed that task poorly.193
For its view that the arbitrator’s task is “interpreting a contract,” Sutter (like Stolt) cited
labor arbitration cases.
Because the parties “bargained for the arbitrator's construction of
their agreement,” an arbitral decision “even arguably construing or
applying the contract” must stand, regardless of a court's view of
its (de)merits. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers,
531 U.S. 57, 62, 121 S.Ct. 462, 148 L.Ed.2d 354 (2000) (quoting
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599,
80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960); Paperworkers v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987);
internal quotation marks omitted). Only if “the arbitrator act[s]
outside the scope of his contractually delegated authority”—
issuing an award that “simply reflect[s] [his] own notions of
[economic] justice” rather than “draw[ing] its essence from the
contract”—may a court overturn his determination. Eastern
Associated Coal, 531 U.S., at 62, 121 S.Ct. 462 (quoting Misco,
484 U.S., at 38, 108 S.Ct. 364). So the sole question for us is
whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the parties'
contract, not whether he got its meaning right or wrong.194
So Sutter is a second recent Supreme Court case emphasizing the dichotomy
between good arbitrators who interpret contracts and bad arbitrators who do something
else instead. In Stolt, that bad something else is “make public policy.” In Sutter, that bad
something else is “the arbitrator act[ing] outside the scope of his contractually delegated
authority—issuing an award that simply reflects his own notions of economic justice.”
While either formulation of the dichotomy may fit contract cases, neither helps courts
191
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reviewing arbitration awards on non-contract claims such as antitrust, securities, and
employment discrimination. Thus, after Sutter—as after Stolt and after Hall Street—
courts, arbitrators, and parties still sorely lack Supreme Court guidance on the
fundamental question whether arbitration awards must apply the law correctly to avoid
vacatur.

III.

CONCLUSION

To resolve the fundamental question whether arbitration awards must apply the
law correctly to avoid vacatur, the Supreme Court can take a case in which a legallyerroneous arbitration award clearly deprives a party of rights conferred by federal
antitrust, securities or employment discrimination statutes. An ideal case would perhaps
look like the example given in section II.C.1 above, that is, a Title VII claim that the
employee initially brought in court but then had to arbitrate due to the employer’s
successful motion to compel arbitration. Issues will be sharpened if the arbitrator rules
for the employer in a legally-erroneous award supported by factual findings leaving no
doubt that a correct application of Title VII would have resulted in a ruling for the
employee.
That is the sort of case that will clarify the law by asking the Supreme Court if it
will:





depart from, or conform the law to, its representation of “judicial scrutiny of
arbitration awards...sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute” giving rise to a mandatory law claim;195
retain or cut back the longstanding rule that courts should confirm awards without
determining whether they are legally-correct;
retain the manifest disregard doctrine and if so, specify its scope; and
decide whether arbitrators exceed their powers when they make errors of law in
non-contract cases.196

Until the Supreme Court takes such a case, the law on vacating legally-erroneous
arbitration awards will remain sorely deficient. Parties, arbitrators, and lower courts
deserve much more clarity than the Supreme Court has thus far provided.
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